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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Joseph Deckert
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science
June 2013
Title: Patterns of Fraud: Tools for Election Forensics
Election fraud is a serious problem in a number of modern democracies. While 
election observers can combat this problem to some extent, election forensics aims to 
provide a low-cost supplement. Forensic tools uncover irregular patterns in aggregate 
election data which are consistent with fraud. This dissertation improves upon existing 
tools and establishes methods of controlling for other factors which could cause irregular 
patterns. These tools are utilized in three cases studies in an effort to better understand the 
nature of election fraud.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The history of modern election fraud is as old as the history of modern elections. 
While democracy expanded in the 20th century and continues to spread worldwide 
(Huntington 1991), accusations of election fraud are endemic in developing democracies 
and continue in established regimes (Schedler 2002). While elections are more common, 
it is not clear that elections have everywhere resulted in democracy.
Election monitoring on the ground has become an important mission of the United 
Nations along with myriad other international organizations (Hyde 2008; Kelley 2009). 
Despite the positive impact that monitoring has had on legitimacy, there are several 
problems with its application. Election monitoring is expensive, and some critics have 
argued that it is often aimed at a show of legitimacy rather than actual effectiveness 
(Carothers 1997). Complex elections with multiple monitoring agencies can create 
problems when the legitimacy of an election is disputed (Kelley 2009).
Election forensics is an alternative approach to gauging the legitimacy of an 
election based on examining patterns in the data and uncovering “irregularities” which 
are consistent with election fraud. This statistical analysis has the advantage of being a 
low-cost supplement to existing monitoring, since it relies on data that is readily 
available. Election forensics can aid election observers by providing information about 
the nature and location of these potentially fraudulent outcomes.
Three important caveats apply when using forensic tools. First is that these tools 
detect large-scale fraud but do not detect small scale fraud (Myagkov and Ordeshook 
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2009, p. 5). Fraud on the scale of a few hundred or few thousand votes will be lost in the 
noise in elections with millions of voters. Second, these tools typically require that fraud 
is present in some locations and not others. Like a polygraph test, we need something of a 
baseline. In order to distinguish patterns of fraud or absence of fraud, clear differences 
must actually exist. Unlike a polygraph, we do not need any a priori information about 
where fraud may have occurred. For these two reasons, election forensics cannot replace 
election monitors but can supplement their work. The third limitation of election 
forensics is that current methods require some fairly restrictive assumptions. These 
assumptions pertain to the assumed distribution of vote counts, turnout, and other 
indicators in the absence of fraud. This dissertation improves on the tools available to 
address this weakness.
This study makes three main contributions to the field of election forensics. First, 
I use computer simulations to develop the theoretical foundation of election forensics and 
improve on existing methods. Forensic tools have focused on finding symptoms that 
could be caused by fraud. But just as a headache could be caused by a number of 
different ailments, irregularities in the data could be caused by fraud or a number of other 
factors. With a more complete theory of how fraud changes patterns in the data we may 
uncover the actual cause of observed irregularities and relax the assumptions made in 
previous work. Second, I use the tools of election forensics to examine two instances that 
occurred during the “third wave” of democratization. While elections have become more 
legitimate in Russia and Mexico, it appears that the latter has been more successful in 
actually attaining democracy. Finally, turning to the United States, I use election forensics 
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to assess the claims of political scientists in regards to the establishment of the Solid 
South. With the end of Reconstruction in 1877, Democrats began disenfranchising the 
opposition and creating a single-party regime. Experts in Southern politics disagree as to 
the effectiveness of the myriad tools used to achieve this end, and by using election 
forensics I can provide estimates of the severity of vote suppression over time. In short, I 
improve on and expand forensic tools and put them into practice in three significant 
cases.
Previous Work in Election Forensics
One of the most comprehensive sets of tools available for detecting these patterns 
is that developed by Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin (2009). The approach that they 
recommend involves analyzing patterns in the distribution of turnout rates and examining 
the relationship between the percentage of the electorate which votes for a candidate 
(absolute support) and turnout rate. They suggest that turnout tends to follow a normal 
distribution. If some election officials stuff the ballot box with votes for one candidate, 
those districts will have a turnout rate that is artificially increased. As some data is shifted 
to the right of the distribution, it will become skewed rather than normal. Additionally, 
Myagkov et al. assume that the relationship between a candidate's absolute support (the 
percentage of eligible voters who vote for that candidate) and turnout should be positive 
and roughly equal to that candidate's relative support (the percentage of ballots cast for 
that candidate). This relationship is fairly intuitive. Assume that a candidate receives, on 
average, 50% of the vote. We would expect that if 10 additional voters came to the polls, 
roughly 5 would vote for that candidate. In other words, the percentage of votes a 
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candidate receives should not differ whether a district has low or high turnout. If vote 
inflation occurs in favor of one candidate, however, it will appear that the candidate has 
stronger support in high turnout districts. This is due to the fact that some of those high 
turnout districts will have had their vote counts artificially inflated in favor of that 
candidate.
Although these developing tools have been subject to internal debate (Deckert, 
Myagkov et al. 2011; Mebane 2011), there remains the promise of an objective research 
agenda that can evaluate the legitimacy of elections. This dissertation seeks to advance 
that project. 
Formal Models of Election Fraud
The literature on election forensics and the literature on decision-making 
regarding fraud have largely been disconnected. In the third chapter of the dissertation I 
attempt to unite these by creating models that will aid in the analysis of election 
legitimacy.
Magaloni (2006) develops a game-theoretic model aimed at explaining why 
authoritarian regimes might hold elections, and why they might “tie their hands” when it 
comes to election fraud. Fearon (2011) also uses game theory to explain in detail the 
behavior of authoritarian regimes. His coverage of election fraud in the model is 
essentially a mere assumption that autocratic regimes will engage in as much fraud as is 
possible without getting caught. Chaves et al. (2009) use choice theory to predict when 
local election officials will engage in fraud for the authoritarian regime. Their model is 
aimed at uncovering the relationship between regional characteristics and fraud decisions, 
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but this model uses fairly unsophisticated metrics for fraud.
I put forth two models of regime behavior. The first is developed in a vein similar 
to that of Magaloni (2006). This model provides a frame of reference for authoritarian 
regimes, allowing for comparisons across nations. I also discuss the generalizability of 
Chaves' (2009) model, which has direct empirical applicability. This model analyzes the 
decisions of local election officials and aids in understanding how choices regarding the 
type and degree of fraud are made. The Chaves model can be tested with the results 
obtained from election forensics.
Case Studies
As a key part of developing the toolkit for detecting election fraud, the 
dissertation covers a number of relevant case studies. 
First Case Study: Russia (Chapter 4)
Russian elections were typified by fraud before the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, and this trend continued afterward (Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2009). 
The legislative election of 2007 is one particularly interesting example, given the fallout 
of election fraud. The republic of Ingushetia reported 98% turnout. The "I did not vote" 
campaign was started by dissidents, and received signatures and passport numbers from 
roughly a third of the electorate who asserted that they did not vote in the election 
(Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2009, p. 128). The initiator of this campaign was later 
arrested, and was shot and killed while in police custody.
Despite attempts at reform, I find that election fraud in Russia remains pervasive. 
I analyze major national elections from 2007 through 2012 and find no major reductions 
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in observed irregularities.
Second Case Study: Transition to Democracy in Mexico (Chapter 5)
The rise of democracy in Latin America has been tumultuous, with allegations of 
election fraud in many new democracies (Chaves, Fergusson et al. 2009; Cothran 1994; 
Lehoucq and Molina 2002). Mexico provides a particularly interesting case. Mexico has 
long been a nominal democracy, and has been highly stable since the cessation of the 
Mexican Revolution (Cothran 1994). Mexico began to transition to democracy following 
economic hardships in the 1980s (Beer, 2003). Although prospects for legitimate 
democracy seemed bright following the 2000 presidential election, allegations of fraud 
returned in the 2006 and 2012 elections. Despite fears that the country may be reverting 
to corruption and illegitimacy, I find that elections in Mexico appear relatively fraud-free. 
The reforms of the 1990s appear to have a lasting and positive impact on the legitimacy 
of elections in Mexico.
Third Case Study: Election Fraud in the United States (Chapter 6)
As one of the world’s oldest democracies, the United States has a long history of 
elections and a long history of election fraud (Campbell 2005). In Chapter 6, I analyze 
the Reconstruction and Redemption eras in the U.S. South. Accounts from the time 
indicate that vote manipulation was rampant in the form of disenfranchisement (Foner 
1988). Scholars disagree in regards to the type and timing of this disenfranchisement. 
Some argue that extralegal means were employed beginning with the end of 
Reconstruction (Key 1949), while others argue that legal disenfranchisement had a more 
serious impact during the height of Redemption (Kousser 1974).
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Forms of Fraud
In the most broad terms, there are only two ways of engaging in election fraud: 
votes can be added, or votes can be subtracted. I will refer to the former as vote inflation, 
and to the latter as vote suppression. Of course, both could occur at the same time. This is 
mathematically equivalent to switching votes from one candidate to another, and I will 
refer to this third possibility as vote stealing. These three types of fraud are explained in 
Table 1.1, along with examples and the forensic tools that can be used to detect them.
There is ample evidence that all three of these types of fraud have been used to 
alter election results. While there are many different ways to engage in fraud, any actual 
mechanism will have one of these three effects. Vote inflation is typically associated with 
"stuffing the ballot box," where election officials fill out fraudulent ballots or simply 
count extra votes for one candidate. The same effect could be achieved if a subset of 
voters votes multiple times. Vote suppression could occur at the official level as well, 
with election officials destroying votes for a particular candidate. There are myriad other 
ways to achieve the same effect. Voter intimidation is a common tactic, and violence has 
often surrounded elections. Vote suppression can be nonviolent as well, and allegations of 
this type of fraud are common. Limiting the voting equipment available to certain 
precincts or placing obstacles such as road closures or insufficient parking could be used 
to target certain voting populations in order to reduce their vote counts. Again, if both 
inflation and suppression happen at the same time, the result is effectively switching 
votes from one candidate to another. This one-to-one change can happen more directly, 
however. One of the oldest traditions in vote fraud is the buying of votes (Campbell 
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2005). Though crude and of arguable efficiency, this technique could be employed to get 
voters themselves to switch their vote from the candidate of their preference to another. 
Of course, election officials could easily engage in this type of behavior by miscounting 
votes for one candidate as votes for another.
Table 1.1. Types of election fraud
Form of Fraud Definition Means Example Cases Forensic Tools
Vote Inflation Adding votes to a 
candidate's total
Ballot box stuffing Russia Myagkov; 
Benford's Law 
Vote 
Suppression
Subtracting votes 
from a 
candidate's total
Voter intimidation, 
destruction of 
ballots
United States, 
Ukraine, 
Colombia
Myagkov; 
Benford's Law
Vote Stealing Switching votes 
from one 
candidate to 
another
Combination of 
the above, 
miscounting of 
ballots
Ukraine, 
Mexico
Myagkov, with a 
priori knowledge
Conclusion
This dissertation makes three significant contributions to the study of election 
fraud. First, it  expands on the existing tools to analyze election data for evidence of 
fraud.  Second, it tests existing methods and develops new ones for dealing with natural 
non-normality. Aggregation error due to underlying regional characteristics is one of the 
largest obstacles facing analysis of election data. By discovering ways of relaxing the 
homogeneous regions assumption, these tools will be much more applicable. Third, the 
project uses these advanced tools to perform comprehensive analysis of elections in 
several regions. While there has been analysis of specific elections using these tools, it 
has typically been narrow in focus and instrumental to developing the tools. Studies that 
have undertaken more in-depth analysis of elections have typically relied on weaker 
measures of fraud. My dissertation bridges the gap between these two sets of literature.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS FOR DETECTING AND MEASURING ELECTION FRAUD
Following a brief definition of election forensics, Chapter II will examine in detail 
methods for detecting election fraud, including indicators, simulation, and alternative 
ways of identifying election fraud. I will summarize the forensic tools currently 
employed by election scholars, and expand one tool developed by Myagkov et al. (2009) 
to expose vote stealing where it exists in addition to vote inflation. After developing 
simulations, I explain the problems associated with normality assumptions and propose 
two methods for controlling for variables that might otherwise be problematic for 
forensic analysis. Finally, I will create a measure of election fraud derived from the 
forensic tools developed in this chapter.
Election Forensics
Election forensics is the relatively new field of assessing the integrity of elections 
based on patterns in the election results. The two main schools of election forensics 
include digit analysis and turnout analysis. The former inspects the frequency of certain 
digits in vote counts (e.g., Beber and Scacco 2008; Cantu and Saiegh 2011; Mebane 
2006), while the latter looks for anomalies in reported turnout (e.g., Herron 2010; 
Myagkov 2009).
The established literature in both schools has focused on uncovering irregularities 
that are  symptomatic of election fraud. I attempt to take the project further by explaining: 
(1) how fraud causes  irregularities, (2) how other factors can cause irregularities, and (3) 
how to determine which is the cause when the data are irregular.
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Established Indicators of Election Fraud
Digit Analysis
One popular method of analyzing elections for evidence of fraud relies on 
analyzing the distribution of particular digits in vote counts. These methods have the 
benefit of requiring little in the way of data as they rely solely on vote counts (Beber and 
Scacco 2008, p. 2; Mebane 2006). They analyze the distribution of digits in reported vote 
counts and compare the actual distributions to those expected in fraud-free elections.
In particular, Benford's Law holds that the distribution of digits in data does not 
follow a uniform pattern. Traditionally, Benford's Law is applied to the first digit in a set 
of data, and holds that the digit 0 will be the most common, 1 the second most common, 
and so on. This result is found when data has a logarithmic distribution. If the distribution 
of the data is skewed such that lower numbers are more common than higher numbers, 
lower digits will also be more common than higher digits. Naturally occurring data often 
have such a skewed distribution, such as with income or population size.  Data which 
have a symmetric distribution do not have such a pattern. Instead, digits in symmetric 
data are likely to be distributed uniformly.
Benford's Law can be observed in a wide range of data, including population 
sizes, disk space usage, and many other types of naturally occurring data (Fewster 2009). 
Deviations from Benford's Law have been used as indicators of fraud in accounting and 
public finance, as they can indicate “non-natural” data generation processes. Since vote 
counts often appear to have a distribution which conforms to the law, proponents of this 
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method argue that deviations may be indicative of fraud (Cantu and Saiegh 2011; Mebane 
2006). 
For example, Cantu and Saiegh (2011) use Benford's Law to analyze the first digit 
of vote counts to examine patterns of fraud in Argentina's presidential elections during 
the “infamous decade.” Additionally relying on the distribution of the first digit, they 
develop a Naïve Bayesian classifier which uses information from the first digit of vote 
counts to categorize elections as fraudulent or clean. They find that the results obtained 
by using this classifier match well with the historical evidence on the elections they 
study.
Mebane (2006) argues that vote totals display a Benford compliant distribution 
not for their first digit, but for their second. He argues that because precinct sizes are 
artificially carved up to be roughly similar rather than naturally occurring, Benford's Law 
will not hold for the first digits (1BL). Instead, precinct sizes comply with Benford's Law 
for second digits (2BL). This pattern remains because vote counts are not the result of a 
simple random process, but rather a complex process involving mathematical 
combinations of random variables from different distributions (Mebane 2006, p. 4).
Analysis of the last digit in vote counts is another method of uncovering patterns 
of fraud along these lines (Beber 2008). While analyzing first or second digits requires 
assumptions that the underlying data should conform to Benford's Law, proponents argue 
that analysis of the last digit requires “extremely weak distributional assumptions” (Beber 
2008, p. 2). The key assumption is that vote counts should have a last digit that follows a 
uniform distribution. Since the data are naturally occurring, we should not expect any 
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digit to appear with a greater frequency than any other. If the data has been manipulated, 
however, particular digits will appear with greater frequency because humans are not 
good at generating random numbers (Beber 2009, p. 6). Essentially, if vote counts have 
been generated by corrupt election officials rather than from actual ballots, the last digits 
will not follow a uniform distribution.
While digit-based methods work well in cases where the available data are 
limited, they have some weaknesses. Digit-based methods are limited in the forms of 
fraud which they can detect. Mebane points out that 2BL analysis works best on what he 
calls “repeaters,” a form of vote-inflation, or when fraud is correlated with a candidate's 
level of support (Mebane 2006, pp. 15-18). Analysis of the last digit only detects fraud 
where actual numbers have been generated by humans making up numbers, and as such 
will not detect common forms of fraud such as ballot box stuffing. Additionally, the 
relevance of Benford's Law in election data has been called into question (Deckert et al. 
2011). While it is true that election data often conform to Benford's Law, it is less clear 
that election fraud will affect the distribution of digits. Moreover, deviations from 
Benford's Law are difficult to attribute to fraud. In essence, analysis relying on Benford's 
Law can easily result in both type I and type II errors and it is not clear how common 
these errors are or what can be done to correct for them.
Given their potential strength when data are limited, digit-based methods have a 
place in the election forensics toolbox. Due to their limitations, however, this dissertation 
focuses on alternative methods that have stronger theoretical foundations and can be 
expanded to incorporate better data.
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Distributions of Turnout
In a clean election, we expect the distribution of turnout rates to be normal at low 
levels of aggregation (Myagkov et al. 2009, p. 45). Most elections in stable, competitive 
democracies have roughly normal distributions of turnout at precinct or district levels. We 
expect that the distribution will be single-peaked and relatively symmetric (an 
assumption which will be relaxed in subsequent sections). Suspicious distributions are 
either skewed, having a “fat tail” where either high or low levels of turnout are more 
common, or they have a second peak. The intuition for this result is fairly simple. In the 
case of ballot box stuffing, when votes are added turnout is increased. If turnout is 
originally normal, and votes are illegitimately added in a subset of polling places, some 
of the data will be shifted to the right as in Figure 2.1, resulting in an asymmetric 
distribution. If votes for a candidate are discarded, the opposite pattern will be visible. As 
turnout is effectively lowered in some areas, parts of the distribution will be shifted to the 
left, resulting in a wider left-hand tail on the distribution. If both vote inflation and vote 
destruction occur at the same time, the effect on the distribution of turnout will be 
lessened. If the inflation and destruction happen at a one-to-one ratio (i.e., vote stealing), 
turnout may appear normally distributed despite the occurrence of election fraud.
The key assumption made here is that the districts in question are “reasonably 
homogeneous and that variations in turnout are the consequence of random or 
uncorrelated factors” (Myagkov et al. 2009, p. 33). If this assumption does not hold, 
turnout may not follow a normal distribution without election fraud.
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Proposition 2.1: Assuming that true turnout has a normal distribution, 
ballot box stuffing will lead to skewness in the distribution. A skewed 
distribution of turnout is therefore consistent with vote inflation.
Figure 2.1. Turnout before and after vote inflation. Synthetic data.
Absolute Support and Turnout
Absolute support refers to the percentage of the eligible electorate that votes for a 
particular candidate. If a candidate gets half of the votes cast in a region where turnout 
was 50%, that candidate’s absolute support will be 25%. Relative support refers to the 
percentage of votes cast that a candidate receives.
In clean elections, absolute support and turnout are expected to be positively 
correlated. As more ballots are cast, each candidate should expect to receive more votes. 
In a regression of absolute support on turnout, we expect the coefficient on turnout to be 
roughly equal to a candidate's average level of relative support for the election. If a 
candidate receives 50% of the vote and there is an increase of 2 voters, we would expect 
that one of those two would vote for that candidate. This pattern is affected by ballot box 
stuffing, in which every additional vote goes to the candidate who is benefiting from the 
fraud. In some districts there are additional votes, but all of those votes go to a single 
candidate. This instance of fraud will be visible in a graph of absolute support and turnout 
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as the regression line of the recipient of fraudulent votes will be pulled upwards by those 
data points that are shifted.
Simulating Election Fraud
In order to examine the effects of different types of fraud on election returns, I use 
stylized data from simulated elections. Cantu and Saiegh (2011) note that synthetic data 
has several advantages for developing and evaluating forensic techniques:
First, we can generate more data sets than what would be available using only real 
data. Second, properties of synthetic data can be tailored to meet various 
conditions which may not be clearly observable in the real data. Third, variations 
of known frauds (or new frauds) can be artificially created to study how these 
changes affect performance parameters, such as the detection rate (Lundin, 
Kvarnstrom, and Jonsson 2002). (Cantu and Saiegh 2011, p. 411)
By using synthetic data it is possible to directly observe the impact of fraud on the 
patterns in the data. Furthermore, data that violate the normality assumptions of Myagkov 
et al. (2009) can be generated. The simulations can be programmed to result in 
distributions of turnout which are not normal due to factors other than fraud. Such data 
can be used to develop and test new techniques which relax those assumptions. This 
would not be possible with “real world” data, as the underlying data generating process is 
unknown. In real world data, we cannot be sure as to the precise impact of election fraud 
or regional characteristics on the distributions of turnout and the other indicators of fraud.
The simulations used here are an extension of the simulations developed by 
Deckert, Myagkov, and Ordeshook (Deckert, Myagkov et al. 2011). These simulations 
begin with a two-dimensional policy space. Two candidates are positioned in that space, 
with their locations being set exogenously. Voters are placed in the policy space, their 
position dependent on a combination of random variables. Once placed, voters make their 
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turnout decision. This decision is also based on a random variable. Those who decide to 
vote cast their vote for whichever of the two candidates is located closer to them in the 
policy space.
Voter i's ideal point (xi, yi) is given by:
xi = b1x * v1i + b2x * v4i + eix,
yi = b1y * v2i + eiy,
where v1i and v4i are random-normal variables and b1x and b2x are constants that determine 
the effect of those variables on the voters’ x position. The noise terms have a normal 
distribution such that eix ~ N (0, σx2) and eiy ~ N (0, σy2) for each voter i.
Voters decide to vote if:
ti = b1v * v3i + b2v * v4i + eit > T,
where ti is the voter’s “turnout score,” v3i and v4i are random-normal variables and b1v and 
b2v are constants that determine the effect of those variables on whether or not the voter 
actually votes; eit is a random-normal error term, and T is the “turnout threshold”—the 
“turnout score” that a voter must exceed in order to cast a vote.
In each district, the characteristic variables of the voters (v1i, v2i, v3i, and v4i) are 
distributed random normal, such that: 
v1i ~ N (m1, σ12), v2i ~ N (m2, σ22), v3i ~ N (m3, σ32), and v4i ~ Exp (m4)
where m is the district level mean for that variable. Here, m is distributed normally 
between districts, such that: 
m1 ~ N (M1, σm12), m2 ~ N (M2, σm22), m3 ~ N (M3, σm32), m4 ~ Exp (M4).
In these simulations, fraud takes the form of either vote inflation or vote stealing. 
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Fraud is always applied in favor of candidate 1. When vote inflation occurs, candidate 1's 
vote total is increased by a given percentage and capped by the number of nonvoters. 
When vote stealing occurs, a percentage of candidate 2's votes are given to candidate 1. 
In either case, the percentage varies between districts and follows a random-normal 
distribution. The likelihood of fraud may vary based on the level of support for candidate 
1.
Alternative Indicators of Election Fraud
Analysis of Support
If we assume that both relative support and absolute support for candidates are 
normally distributed across districts, election fraud will cause shifts in these distributions 
in the same way that fraud causes shifts in the turnout distribution. In elections where 
turnout is low and the variance of absolute support is high, absolute support may have a 
truncated normal distribution. Since absolute support cannot be below zero, the left-hand 
tail may be short. In these cases, analysis of the distribution of absolute support might not 
be as useful as analysis of relative support.
While analysis of turnout and the absolute support-turnout relationship are able to 
discover patterns consistent with vote inflation and vote suppression, they are less suited 
for distinguishing between clean elections and vote stealing. Vote stealing may appear in 
the relationship between absolute support and turnout, but is difficult to uncover without 
a priori knowledge (Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2009, p. 47), due to the fact that vote 
stealing will not appear in turnout distributions, and its patterns in absolute support versus 
turnout could be drowned out by noise and other factors.
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Although turnout is not affected by vote stealing, levels of support are. Therefore, 
looking at the distributions of relative support can be analyzed for consistency with vote 
stealing. Analysis of absolute support can provide information as to the type of fraud 
employed. If vote manipulation comes in the form of vote inflation, the absolute support 
histogram for the perpetrator will shift to the right as in Figure 2.2. The distribution of 
absolute support for the victim will not change. On the other hand, if vote suppression is 
driving the shift, the victim will see a leftward shift in distribution of absolute support, 
while the perpetrator's distribution will be unchanged. In either case, turnout will shift as 
well. If vote stealing is the underlying mechanism of fraud, turnout will remain normal 
but both candidates will see shifts in their distributions of absolute support. It is likely 
that any fraudulent election will have instances of all three types of fraud. This 
diagnostic, however, will help determine the extent of the three forms of fraud.
Figure 2.2. Absolute support for a candidate before and after vote stealing.
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Corrections for Natural Non-Normality
Analysis of the distributions of turnout and support rests on the assumption that, 
in a clean election, turnout and support will be normally distributed. Further, analysis of 
the turnout and absolute support relationship assumes that the correlation between the 
two should not be very different than a candidate's relative support—that is, support for a 
particular candidate is not a function of turnout.
An underlying variable may cause turnout to be skewed if the variable is 
correlated with turnout and does not have a symmetric distribution. If this same variable 
is also correlated with support for a candidate, it might appear that the election results are 
irregular due to vote inflation.
As a simple example, higher levels of wealth might be correlated with increased 
turnout. In addition, wealth may also be correlated with support for the candidate who is 
further to the right in the ideological space. At the precinct level, wealth may have an 
asymmetric distribution. There may be a small number of wealthy precincts and a 
relatively large number of poorer precincts. This could result in a skewed distribution of 
turnout. Those few wealthy high-turnout districts may also have higher than average 
support for the more right-leaning candidate. This could lead to the erroneous conclusion 
that ballot box stuffing occurred in favor of that candidate.
I refer to this problem as “natural non-normality,” a specific form of heterogeneity 
that leads to distributions of turnout and support which are skewed by variables other 
than election fraud. Figure 2.3 illustrates this problem. Both distributions appear skewed 
with a wide right-hand tail. In one case this skewed effect is caused by vote inflation, and 
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in the other, by natural non-normality. Myagkov, et al. (2009) analyze the “flow of votes” 
from one election to the next. They expect that candidates will receive a similar number 
of votes from one election to the next and that substantial deviations from this pattern 
indicate foul play. I propose two alternative methods for addressing this problem.
In this section, I develop two alternatives to address the problem of natural non-
normality. The first, the “Jaws” method, does not require any additional data. Instead, it 
looks at patterns in the residuals obtained by regressing turnout on absolute support. The 
second, the residual analysis method, requires information on additional variables that 
affect turnout and support. It analyzes the residuals obtained by regressing turnout or 
support on these variables.
Figure 2.3. Turnout with vote inflation or natural non-normality.
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The Jaws Method
Natural non-normality leads to patterns in the data similar to those seen as a result 
of vote inflation. A crucial difference exists, however, that may reveal the underlying 
process. At the high end of turnout, most districts fall above the regression line for the 
candidate who benefited from vote inflation, and most districts fall below the regression 
line for the candidate whose votes were not altered.
Each district has two entries on the graph, one for each candidate. As vote 
inflation occurs for one candidate, both of these entries are shifted. For the candidate who 
receives additional votes, the data point is shifted up and to the right at a 45 degree angle. 
If there are 100 eligible voters in a district, and 1 more vote is added to the candidate, this 
candidate’s absolute support is increased by 1% and turnout is also increased by 1%. This 
shift will virtually always place the district above the regression line, because the 
maximum value for the slope of the regression line is 1 (each vote going to the candidate 
in question). The data point for the other candidate will be shifted also, but to the left. 
This outcome is due to the fact that the candidate's vote count, and therefore absolute 
support, does not change.
The turnout in the district is changed, however, so this data point will be shifted to 
the left. When votes are inflated for one candidate after the fact, the data is shifted in a 
way that forces the regression lines away from each other, like opening jaws. By contrast, 
the districts with natural non-normality have data which is distributed on both sides of the 
regression lines, regardless of levels of turnout. Here the data is not shifted 
systematically, but is instead the result of naturally-occurring variation. This pattern can 
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be observed in Figure 2.4. At the high end of turnout the data points tend to lie above the 
regression line in the presence of fraud, while they are distributed on both sides of the 
line in the presence of natural non-normality.
Figure 2.4. Turnout versus absolute support. Vote inflation and natural non-
normality.
This method poses two drawbacks. First, it is not always clear that outliers are a 
result of election fraud. Second, when there is both election fraud and natural non-
normality, this method cannot really tell the difference (see Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5. Both NNN and vote inflation.
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The Residual Analysis Method
We can determine whether or not turnout is normally distributed when controlling 
for other factors by regressing turnout on those variables and evaluating the normality of 
the residuals. This method requires more information than vote counts and turnout. 
Without additional information, however, election forensics may remain susceptible to 
something akin to omitted variables bias. In order to determine whether irregularities are 
caused by fraud or by other factors, we need information on those other factors.
This method assumes that the residuals obtained by regressing turnout or support 
on explanatory variables are normally distributed in clean elections. If fraud is an 
important variable in determining turnout or levels of support, then the regression may 
display irregularities. As turnout and support are artificially increased in some precincts, 
the data shifts in a predictable way. If turnout is plotted on the y-axis and an explanatory 
variable (e.g., income) is plotted on the x-axis, as vote inflation occurs some of the data 
points shift vertically as their reported number of votes is increased. This pattern can be 
seen in Figure 2.6. When the regression is performed, the regression line also moves 
vertically. In an extreme case, the data points will appear to form two distinct lines. Since 
the regression line would fall in the middle, the residuals will have a bimodal rather than 
a normal distribution. The shift in the distribution of the residuals is similar to the shift in 
turnout or absolute support as discussed in the preceding sections.
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Figure 2.6. Simulation data.
As an example, I analyze the U.S. Presidential election returns in Georgia in 2008. 
While there is almost certainly some degree of fraud and corruption in U.S. elections, we 
assume that it is at an insignificant level. For this reason, the U.S. Presidential elections 
are often used to test forensic techniques for false positives. If we look at the distributions 
in the 2008 Presidential election in Georgia (Figure 2.7), the data is consistent with a 
significant amount of ballot box stuffing for candidate Barack Obama.
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Figure 2.7. Distribution of relative support for Obama, Georgia 2008.
One possible, non-fraudulent explanation for Georgia's non-normality is the 
idiosyncratic racial politics of the South. In the politics of the U.S. South, race is an 
important variable, and arguably played a key role in many areas in the 2008 presidential 
election (see, example.g., Philpot 2009). White voters tend to be more conservative and 
vote Republican, where African-American voters tend to vote Democrat. Data on racial 
demographics is available from the U.S. Census Bureau, and is compiled with election 
results by the Public Mapping Project. In order to measure racial composition, I use the 
percentage of the census district that is white and nonhispanic. This variable is not 
distributed normally or symetrically in the data, as evident in Figure 2.8. Instead, there 
tend to be high degrees of concentration—districts which are almost entirely white or 
nonwhite.
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Figure 2.8. Percent of population that identifies as white.
Given what we know about voter preferences, this may cause the nonsymmetry 
seen in the distribution of Obama's relative support. If Obama does better in 
predominantly nonwhite areas than in predominantly white areas, we would not be 
surprised at the spread in his support or that it has a large concentration at the low end. If 
we regress his degree of relative support on racial composition, the residuals appear to be 
normally distributed. The percentage white variable is logged in order to account for 
nonlinearity in the relationship, which would otherwise influence the distribution of 
residuals. Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of the residuals from regressing relative 
support for Obama on race. Controlling for race, Obama's relative support is normal and 
not consistent with vote inflation.
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Figure 2.9. Residuals from regressing turnout on percentage white.
In contrast, the Russian Presidential election of 2008 presents a case where 
irregularities persist even after controlling for other important variables. This election 
was likely plagued by fraud. Analysis of turnout and the relative support for Dmitri 
Medvedev, Vladimir Putin's hand-picked successor, show irregularities. Both turnout and 
his absolute support have wide right tails, consistent with vote inflation. However, it is 
possible that this phenomenon is driven by the urban-rural divide. This divide is regarded 
as one of the most significant cleavages in Russian politics (see, e.g., Berezkin, et al, 
1999; Gehlbach, 2000). Traditionally, communist candidates tend to do better in more 
rural areas. Population density does not have a normal distribution among the 83 federal 
subjects (akin to states) of Russia. This, rather than vote inflation, could drive the 
observed skewness in Medvedev's relative support.
The irregularities in the data persist even after controlling for population density. I 
use population density to measure the degree of urbanization. This data is available at the 
oblast level from the ArcticStat Socioeconomic Circumpolar Database. When regressing 
Medvedev's relative support on population density, the relationship is confirmed. Here 
27
Medvedev receives more of the vote in more densely populated regions. However, the 
distribution of the residuals retains the fat right tail from the distribution of his support. 
Figure 2.10 shows that this pattern, consistent with vote inflation, persists even when 
controlling for population density. This outcome suggests that population density is not 
the driving force in the skewness in the distribution. Instead, the data still appears to be 
consistent with vote inflation.
Figure 2.10. Relative support for Medvedev and residuals from regressing 
relative support on population density.
To further evaluate this technique, I run 324 elections with varying parameter 
values (see Appendix A) and fifty precincts in each. In half of these elections, vote 
inflation occurs in favor of one candidate. In the other half, there is no fraud but there is 
natural non-normality. Table 2.1 shows the results of skewness-kurtosis tests for the 
normality of the residuals obtained by regressing the logarithm of turnout on the 
logarithm of a control variable in these elections. False negatives occur when the null 
hypothesis of normality is not rejected at the .1 level despite the presence of vote 
inflation. False positives occur when the null hypothesis of normality is rejected at the .1 
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level despite the absence of any fraud. In these simulations, the residual analysis method 
results in a false negative rate of 35.8% and a false positive rate of 15.4%. Many of these 
errors can be prevented with visual inspection. These numbers indicate that the residual 
analysis method can be fairly successful in detecting fraud while controlling for other 
factors. Furthermore, the test is relatively conservative, which may be desirable from a 
methodological point of view, placing the burden of proof on those arguing that fraud is 
present.
Table 2.1. Skewness and kurtosis tests for normality of residuals from simulated 
elections.
No NNN, Vote Inflation False Negative Rate: 35.8% (58/162)
NNN, no fraud False Positive Rate: 15.4% (25/162)
Measuring Fraud
Developments in election forensics have largely focused on detecting anomalies. 
Efforts to actually measure election fraud have been less common. In this section I use 
simulation data to evaluate the measures. The simulations vary in the presence of natural 
non-normality, the type of fraud (vote inflation or vote stealing), the average degree of 
fraud (the percentage of votes inflated or stolen), the probability that fraud occurs in any 
given precinct, and the relationship between the likelihood that fraud occurs and support 
for one candidate or the other. Fraud may be equally likely across all precincts, be more 
likely for a candidate who has strong support in the precinct, or be more likely for a 
candidate who has weak support in the precinct. Appendix A presents more detailed 
information on the parameter values used. Each election in the simulation contains 50 
districts, and simulation parameters vary in several ways. Candidate 1's relative support 
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varies between 40%, 50%, and 60%. Additionally there may be natural non-normality 
caused by a non-normal underlying variable, or all of the underlying variables may be 
normally distributed. The nature of fraud was allowed to vary a great deal. Two types of 
fraud were used: vote inflation and vote stealing. The probability that fraud occurred in 
areas with low support for Candidate 1 varied between 20%, 35%, and 50%. The 
probability that fraud occurred in areas with high support for Candidate 1 also varied 
between 20%, 35%, and 50%. The amount of fraud that occurred also varied, with votes 
being inflated or stolen at rates of 20%, 35%, and 50%. These parameters result in 324 
possible combinations. Each combination was simulated 200 times, for a total of 64,800 
simulated elections.
I propose a measure based on the skewness value for the distributions of the data. 
The measure of skewness for a sample captures the magnitude and direction of 
asymmetry. Because the methods of fraud under study typically result in an asymmetric 
shift in the data, the degree of asymmetry should capture the degree of election fraud 
which occurred. For a probability distribution, skewness is defined as: E[(x – μ)3].
A statistical test for symmetry or normality is not appropriate for two reasons. 
First, we do not wish to estimate the likelihood that the data is asymmetric, but the degree 
to which it is asymmetric. Second, tests for symmetry are highly sensitive to the number 
of observations. In real world data, with a large number of observations and distribution 
that is only approximately normal, symmetry is much too easily rejected. Table 2.2 shows 
the results of skewness-kurtosis tests on turnout in Minnesota in 2008. On visual 
inspection, the distribution appears fairly normal and symmetric. Normality is rejected 
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based on the skewness-kurtosis test. Only by analyzing a smaller, random sample can the 
data pass this test. 
Table 2.2. Skewness-kurtosis tests for normality of turnout in Minnesota, 2008
Number of 
observations
Chi Squared 
Test Statistic
P 
value
4,119 (all precincts) . 0.0000
200 40.41 0.0000
100 26.20 0.0000
75 10.52 .0052
50 3.44 .1788
In each case I use the absolute value of skewness values in order to assess the 
magnitude of the skewness.
Hypothesis 2.1: In clean elections without natural non-normality, skewness = 
0 for turnout. In elections with vote stealing, skewness = 0 for turnout. In 
elections with vote inflation, skewness ≠ 0 for turnout.
Table 2.3 shows the results of the simulations. The distributions for turnout are not 
skewed when there is neither natural non-normality nor vote inflation. Vote inflation 
results in skewness in the distributions. The skewness increases as fraud increases. This 
indicates that ballot box stuffing will create a shift in the distribution, as argued by 
Mygakov, et al. (2009).
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Table 2.3. Skewness measures for turnout in the absence of natural non-normality
Type of Fraud Mean Skewness, Turnout Standard Deviation
None .001 0.340
Vote Stealing .001 0.342
Vote Inflation, 20% .251 .380
Vote Inflation, 35% .458 .378
Vote Inflation, 50% .624 .360
Hypothesis 2.2: In clean elections with natural-non normality,  skewness ≠ 0. 
Skewness = 0 for the residuals of the regression of turnout on non-normal 
explanatory variables.
In the elections with natural non-normality, skewness for turnout has a mean of .
308 with a standard deviation of .07. Regressing turnout on the control variable results in 
residuals which have skewness of -.509 on average. This situation suggests that skewness 
is less useful when analyzing residuals, since it may be too sensitive. In these cases it is 
essential to visually inspect the resulting distributions, and future work should seek to 
derive better measures.
Hypothesis 2.3: When vote stealing occurs, the skewness of absolute support 
will increase for both candidates. When vote inflation occurs, skewness of 
absolute support will increase for the beneficiary of fraud and not change for 
the victim of fraud.
Skewness of absolute support appears to be a good predictor of fraud. A t test for 
the difference of means between the prefraud skewness and postfraud skewness for 
candidate 1 rejects the null hypothesis with a t value of -42.058. Skewness increases in 
the presence of fraud, confirming Hypothesis 2.3. For candidate 2, a t test for difference 
of means suggests that skewness is a valid measure for vote stealing. The test rejects the 
null hypothesis with t value of -37.904. Table 2.4 provides summary statistics for the 
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skewness of absolute support for each candidate in the absence of natural non-normality. 
The pattern is less extreme in these cases than it is for turnout when vote inflation is the 
method of fraud.
Absolute support sometimes has a high value for candidate 1 even in the absence 
of fraud. Since absolute support tends to be fairly low, this can be caused by the 
truncation of an otherwise normal distribution. Visual inspection remains a useful tool for 
evaluating these cases.
Table 2.4. Skewness measures for absolute support
Type of fraud Candidate Mean Skewness, 
Absolute Support
Standard Deviation
None Candidate 1 .221 .301
Vote inflation or 
Vote stealing
Candidate 1 .307 .420
None Candidate 2 .093 .294
Vote Inflation Candidate 2 .090 .294
Vote Stealing Candidate 2 .245 .314
Hypothesis 2.4: In an election with natural non-normality, the residuals 
obtained by regressing absolute support on non-normal explanatory 
variables will have higher skewness in the presence of fraud than in the 
absence of fraud.
When analyzing the residuals of this regression, the data from the simulations do 
not appear to confirm Hypothesis 2.4. In the set of 64,800 simulations with 50 districts 
each, the mean of skewness for the residuals in the absence of fraud is -.740 and the mean 
of skewness for the residuals in the presence of fraud is -.631. When increasing the 
number of districts, the data do support Hypothesis 2.4. This suggests that the skewness 
measure's sensitivity to outliers may make it more appropriate when there are a large 
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number of districts. In simulations with 1,000 districts in each election, the residuals 
obtained by regressing absolute support on the log of the control variable have an 
increase in skewness following election fraud. In the absence of fraud, the mean 
skewness is .115 with a standard deviation of .067. Following election fraud of either 
type, the mean skewness is .227 with a standard deviation of .207. The t test for 
difference of means rejects the null hypothesis with a t value of -6.861.
On review, it appears that the measure of skewness has the potential to serve as a 
measure for fraud. Future research should continue to test and refine this measure. In later 
chapters I will use this measure to take a deeper look at election fraud and attempt to 
uncover factors that influence the use of various forms of fraud.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tackled two serious obstacles in the field of election 
forensics. By using regression based techniques, I developed a tool for analyzing 
electoral returns for irregularities while controlling for important factors such as wealth, 
racial diversity, or other demographic issues. Then, based on a comprehensive set of 
forensic tools, I have suggested a measure for election fraud.
In subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I put these tools to use analyzing 
elections from three different regions. From a methodological perspective, this provides 
an opportunity to test these tools on cases where we have established literature and first-
hand accounts as to the degree and types of fraud employed. The tools developed here 
can describe the nature of election fraud allowing for a level of analysis for these 
elections than has been undertaken before. From a comparative perspective, 
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understanding the nature of election fraud in these three cases can inform theories about 
election fraud and democratic transitions more broadly.
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CHAPTER III
FORMAL THEORIES OF ELECTION FRAUD
In this chapter I develop a general model of whether or not a “machine party” (a 
single party capable of controlling and manipulating the election process) holds elections 
and how much fraud such a party decides to engage in. This model helps guide election 
forensics in ways that previous models do not, which will be discussed more fully in the 
conclusion. In the context of election forensics, this type of modeling exercise is novel. 
Previous models of fraud (e.g., Chaves et al. 2009; Fearon 2011; Magaloni 2006) were 
not motivated by forensics.
Next, I discuss the generalizability of the model found in Chaves et al. (2009). 
This model seeks to predict fraud at a more local level. Rather than focusing on top-down 
fraud, this model focuses on bottom-up fraud. In other words, local election officials have 
incentives to report vote counts favorable for the machine party and are subject to local 
constraints.
Previous Models of Election Fraud
Several authors have put forward rational choice based models regarding election 
fraud. The most broad of these look at the decisions made by ruling regimes regarding 
fraud. Magaloni (2006) uses a sequential game to explain why authoritarian regimes may 
hold elections in the first place and why they may create and abide by election reform 
laws aimed at curbing fraud. Magaloni argues that regimes will hold elections to create 
illusions of legitimacy, but will engage in fraud when they know that they will be accused 
of it regardless of the amount of fraud that actually takes place. In contrast, they may 
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actually “tie their hands” by agreeing to antifraud reforms when they believe they can 
win elections legitimately and when the opposition is united enough to lobby for those 
reforms. Fearon (2011) creates a similarly macro-level model of the behavior of 
authoritarian regimes. Fraud is not given such detailed treatment in Fearon’s model, 
however. Instead, he assumes that regimes will engage in as much fraud as they believe 
they can get away with. Punishment, either from international pressure or domestic 
opposition, is the sole constraint.
Other models focus more on decisions regarding the nature of fraud itself. Kalinin 
and Mebane (2011) look at the effect of internal politics on election fraud in Russia. They 
find that local elites had incentives that changed over time. During the decentralization of 
the 1990s, local elites had less accountability to the established party and therefore did 
not have to deliver in terms of fraud. When this pattern shifted, the threat of punishment 
from the central government provided an incentive for local elites to engage in fraud. 
Chaves et al. (2009) analyze the 1922 presidential election in Colombia. They develop 
predictions based on their model of the decisions made by local elites. In this model, 
officials attempt to maximize the margin of victory for the conservative party. They are 
constrained by the cost of fraud in terms of public backlash, but this cost is mitigated by 
the presence of proconservative clergy. Since the presence of clergy is correlated with 
higher legitimate vote counts for the conservative party, they predict a nonlinear 
relationship between the number of clergy in a region and the amount of fraud that takes 
place. More priests make fraud less costly, but also reduce the amount of fraud that can 
occur since more of the ballots were cast for conservatives in the first place.
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While Kalinin and Mebane (2011) and Chaves et al. (2009) examine specific 
nations, other authors have developed generalizable models to explain the choices made 
regarding the type of fraud employed. Nichter (2008) and Gans-Morse et al. (2009) 
discuss the variety of tools available to those who wish to manipulate elections. Given 
different characteristics of potential voters, different methods may be more appropriate. 
For example, if a particular election features a high number of opposition voters who are 
disinclined to vote, it may be cost-effective to pay them to ensure that they do not vote. 
If, on the other hand, voting is not very costly, it may be better to pay them more to 
change their vote.
In this chapter I rely on the models developed by Magaloni (2006) and Chaves et 
al. (2009). Drawing from these models allows me to provide pictures of fraud from two 
different directions: top-down and bottom-up. Table 3.1 presents the models of election 
fraud discussed above.
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Table 3.1. Models of election fraud
Model Type Players Key Assumptions/Features Key Parameters Findings
Chaves et 
al.
Choice 
Theoretic
Regional 
Election 
Authority
-Vote inflation is achieved by ballot 
box stuffing
-Vote destruction is achieved through 
coercion
-Regional authorities seek to maximize 
the margin of victory for the 
conservative party, subject to costs of 
fraud
p – priests
s – ballot stuffing
c – coercion
-Model to predicts the effect of p on s and c. 
Essentially, p affects the costs of each strategy
-Measuring s and c, the test empirically for the 
effect of p
-Explains the effect of regional variables on the 
degree or likelihood of fraud
Gans-
Morse, 
Mazzuca,
Nichter
Game 
Theoretic 
Party Machine,
Voters
-Party knows voters preferences and 
propensity to vote
-Election fraud happens through direct 
interaction with voters
x – level of 
support for party 
machine
c – cost of voting
-Parties will use a variety of methods to alter vote 
counts
-The rate at which methods are employed depends 
on voter preferences and institutional factors
-They compare with empirical evidence from 
Brazil, Russia, and Argentina
-Explains how machines allocate resources to 
alter voter behavior
Mebane Game 
Theoretic
National party, 
local authorities
-During de-centralization, bargaining 
between regional authorities and 
national party takes place before 
elections
-During centralization, national party 
may reward or punish regional 
governors postelection
d – value of 
punishment to gov.
λ – prob. a gov is 
loyal
b – value of 
rewards to 
governors for 
fraud
-Looks at Russian elections and explains the 
difference in fraud in the 90's versus 00's as a 
change in the structure of the game, as 
punishment became more viable later
-Explains the decision of local authorities to 
commit fraud in the face of rewards/punishment 
from national party
Magaloni Game 
Theoretic
Party Machine, 
Opposition 
parties, voters
-Divided opposition
-Imperfect information, opposition 
does not know if there was or was not 
fraud
Many -Established parties are likely to “tie their hands” 
when they think they can win anyway, when 
opposition is united
-They will engage in fraud when they believe they 
will face some backlash either way, and when the 
military is on their side
-Explains why authoritarian regimes decisions 
regarding fraud and institutional “hand-tying”
39
Micro-level Model
Chaves et al. (2009) develop a model of the behavior of local election officials 
incentivized to deliver wide margins of victory to the machine party. In an attempt to 
curry favor with the regime, local authorities seek to maximize the returns for the 
machine party. At the national level, the goal may be to maximize the chances of reaching 
a plurality. When this plurality is likely without fraud, the regime may choose clean 
elections. In contrast, local officials are not necessarily concerned with a simple plurality. 
Most elections do not feature winner-take-all systems at the regional level. Officials at 
the precinct and county levels have an incentive to make the margin of victory as large as 
possible in their sphere of influence in order to maximize the machine party's chances at 
success. They are constrained by two factors: the number of eligible voters and the cost 
associated with engaging in election fraud. As before, these costs come in the form of 
civil unrest or reporting by election monitors. 
The objective function of the regional election authorities is then expressed as 
follows:
(1)
Where vc is the number of votes for the machine (conservative) party, vL is the number of 
votes for the challenging (liberal) party. The choice variables are s and c: s is the amount 
of ballot box stuffing in votes inflated for the machine party, c is the amount of vote 
suppression that takes place, and p is a regional characteristic associated with support for 
the machine party. In the Chaves example, this regional characteristic is the number of 
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priests in a given region. Regions with more priests tend to be more conservative. The 
cost associated with vote suppression is lower in these regions, as the opposition has less 
support and power. ρ is a parameter denoting the value of the machine party's margin of 
victory, φ is a parameter that captures the cost of vote inflation, and ψ is a parameter that 
captures the cost of vote suppression. 
The constraint that the local authorities face is:
(2) vc + vL + s – d ≤ vmax 
The reported number of votes must be less than or equal to the number of voters (vmax). 
The Chaves example treats the maximum number of votes as one third of the total 
population. Reported vote counts higher than this would be treated with suspicion, and 
come with the risk of having the region's votes disqualified. Furthermore, the number of 
votes the machine party receives is a function of the regional characteristic p, and the 
number of votes the opposition party receives is a function of the amount of vote 
suppression which takes place:
(3) vc = f(p)
where f '(p) > 0.
(4) vL = g(c)
where g' < 0 and g'' > 0.
As Chaves et al. (2009) note, the inequality in equation (2) may not be binding. 
They argue that, empirically, it usually does bind. When officials engaged in fraud, they 
did so to a high degree. Often officials reported vote counts that were right on the edge of 
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believability. The value of vmax may vary from one case to another. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, reported turnout values of 100% are fairly common in Russia. Chaves et al. 
(2009) assume that the inequality binds. So we can write:
(5) s = vmax – h(p) – g(c)
and substitute this into the objective function. This leads to the first order conditions:
(6) 
−2ρ g ' (c)−ψ
p
+ϕ(vmax−h( p)−g (c))g ' (c)=0
Chaves, et al. then derive comparative statics for vote inflation and vote suppression. Of 
key interest here is the relationship between the two types of fraud and the regional 
characteristic p:
(7) δc
δ p
=
ψ
p2
c−ϕ g ' (c)h ' ( p)
−ω >0
(8) 
δ s
δ p
=−h ' ( p)⏟
negative
+−g ' (c) δc
δ p⏟
positive
So the amount of vote suppression depends on the regional characteristic. As this 
characteristic increases, so does the ability of election officials to engage in vote 
destruction without fear of reprisal. Therefore, we should expect to see more fraud in 
regions where the machine party enjoys high support. The result for vote inflation implies 
that the relationship between the amount of vote inflation and the regional characteristic 
p is ambiguous. At high levels of p, the support for the machine party is high enough to 
eliminate the need for ballot box stuffing. Turnout cannot be increased any further.
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Macro-level Model
An extensive “game tree” representation of my model is found in Figure 3.1. In 
the first stage of the game—period 1.1—the “machine party” decides whether to hold 
clean elections, fraudulent elections, or no elections. For simplicity, I assume a first-past-
the-post election determines control of government. (We will consider other institutional 
assumptions below). Note that this is a very majoritiarian assumption. In this system, the 
machine party seeks to maximize its chances of winning by obtaining a plurality, and 
minimizing the negative costs of accusations of fraud.
If the machine party does not hold elections, the opposition may stage protests. 
Whether the party wins or loses the election is based on chance, with the probability of a 
“win” or loss varying between clean and fraudulent elections. A machine party loss ends 
the game. If the machine party wins, the opposition chooses whether to fight the results 
or acquiesce.
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Figure 3.1. Game tree for the macro-level model.
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Theoretical results
I make the following assumptions about the parameters:
uW > uL: the machine party would rather win than lose the election.
p > q: When the machine party engages in fraud, it increases its likelihood of 
winning the election.
Hypothesis 1: Regimes will hold elections and engage in fraud when:
1.1) p(usf) + (1-p)(uL) > ua, p(usf) + (1-p)(uL) >  q(us) + (1-q)(uL), and
vLs – c2 > vL >vas (case where the opposition will fight fraud but not protest);
1.2) p(usf) + (1-p)(uL) > ua - s1, p(usf) + (1-p)(uL) >  q(us) + (1-q)(uL), and
vLs – c2 > vas > vL (case where the opposition will fight fraud and protest);
1.3) p(uw) + (1 – p)(uL) > ua, vL > vas and vL > vLs – c2 (case where the opposition 
will acquiesce to both);
or 
1.4) p(uw) + (1 – p)(uL) > ua - s1, and vas > vL > vLs – c2 (case where the opposition 
will protest but not fight fraud).
In 1.1 and 1.2 (these are labeled in Fig. 3.1), “f” dominates “a” for the opposition. 
In these cases, the machine party will engage in fraud if the increased chance of winning 
offsets the additional cost of sanctions when there is fraud (the difference between us and 
usf). In 1.3 and 1.4, the opposition will not fight fraud as “a” dominates “f.” As a result, 
the machine party will engage in fraud since uw > uL and fraud increases its chances of 
winning. 
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Hypothesis 2: Regimes will hold elections and not engage in fraud when:
2.1) p(usf) + (1-p)(uL) > ua, q(us) + (1-q)(uL) > p(usf) + (1-p)(uL), and
vLs – c2 > vL > vas (opposition fights and does not protest);
2.2) p(usf) + (1-p)(uL) > ua - s1, q(us) + (1-q)(uL) > p(usf) + (1-p)(uL), and
vLs – c2 > vas > vL (opposition fights and protests);
2.3) q(uw) + (1-q)(uL) > p(uw) + (1-p)(uL), q(uw) + (1-q)(uL) > ua – s1, and
vas > vL > vLs – c2 (opposition protests and does not fight);
2.4) q(uw) + (1-q)(uL) > p(uw) + (1-p)(uL), q(uw) + (1-q)(uL) > ua, vL > vas and
vL > vLs – c2 (opposition neither fights nor protests).
2.3 and 2.4 are in violation of the assumption that uW > uL. Since the opposition 
will not fight fraud, the machine party will always engage in fraud in equilibrium. In 1.1 
and 1.2, the opposition fights fraud. In these cases, the machine party will not engage in 
fraud when the sanctions are worse (us > usf) and this difference is not offset by an 
increase in the probability that the machine party will win the election. Essentially, 
regimes will not engage in fraud when the sanctions associated with fraud are high and 
the utility of ruling as a dictator is a lower than expected utility of running a legitimate 
election.
Hypothesis 3: Regimes will hold elections and may or may not engage in 
fraud when:
3.1) vLs – c2 > vL> vLs – c1
In this case, the opposition would prefer to fight when there is fraud, and 
acquiesce when there is not. Because the opposition is uncertain as to the machine party's 
move, it may be willing to play mixed strategies in equilibrium if the machine party is 
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also playing mixed strategies. 
The machine party will play F with probability m and -F with probability 1-m. 
The challenger will play “a” with probability n and f with probability 1-n. In equilibrium:
3.2) m = (-qvL +qvLS- qc1) / (pvL  – qvL  - pvLS + pc2 +qvLs – qc1);
3.3) n = (-pusf  + puL + qus – quL) / (puw – pusf – quw + qus).
Proposition 1: The more competitive the election, the more likely the machine 
party is to engage in fraud.
Proof:
From 3.2:
δm
δ p
=
q(v L−(v LS−c1))(v L−(vCS−c2))
( pv L−qv l− pvLS+pc2+qvLS−qc1)
2
By inspection, the numerator is negative since q is positive, vL – (vLS – c1) is 
positive as in 3.1, and vL – (vCS – c2) is negative as in 3.1. When the machine party adopts 
mixed strategies in response to fraud, it is less likely to engage in fraud, as the likelihood 
that it will win without fraud increases.
This result is notably different than the results obtained from the micro-level 
model. In the micro-level model, fraud aims to increase that margin of victory, not 
increase the odds of success. Therefore, support for the machine party means more vote 
suppression and potentially more fraud. From the perspective of national parties 
concerned with pluralities or even a given margin of victory, more support for the 
machine party will generally mean less fraud.
Conclusion
The models developed in this chapter expand on those developed by Magaloni 
47
(2006) and by Chaves et al. (2009). Macro-level models capture the decisions of national 
level machine parties. Micro-level models capture the decisions of local elites. 
Within these two systems we also have empirical predictions that can be tested. At 
the micro-level, I predict that fraud will have a non-linear relationship with factors that 
are correlated with increased support for the perpetrator of fraud. At low levels of 
support, it may be difficult for elites to get away with fraud due to the potential for 
unrest. At high levels of support, it is not possible to manipulate the vote to an extreme 
degree since the returns are already so favorable. Fraud is more likely to occur in regions 
with mixed levels of support. At the macro-level, I predict that fraud will be more 
common in more competitive elections. Electoral authoritarian regimes are typically 
concerned with balancing a healthy margin of victory with the appearance of legitimacy. 
To this extent, they will attempt to engage in only as much fraud as necessary to obtain 
their electoral goals.
Individual cases are better represented by one model or the other. For example, 
election fraud in Mexico appears to be a top-down phenomenon. The 1988 election is 
infamous for the fraud committed at the national level. When it appeared that the PRI 
candidate was poised to lose the election, the computers at the central election agency 
“crashed,” and the establishment won the election once the computers “came back 
online.” Mexico fits the predictions found in our macro-level model: Fraud was severe in 
the competitive 1988 election but was reduced in 1994 when the PRI candidate enjoyed 
much more popularity. In contrast, Russia may be an example of more bottom-up fraud. 
Local electoral officials have had an incentive to provide election returns favorable to 
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United Russia and Vladimir Putin. In the most recent presidential election, Putin 
appeared to take steps to reduce fraud by installing webcams in virtually every polling 
place. Due to his popularity, Putin would win elections in Russia even without fraud. 
While large victories may give him more political clout, given international concerns 
about legitimacy may urge him to genuinely want fraud decreased. Therefore, the 
different predictions generated by these two models may enable us to determine the 
driving forces behind fraud in particular elections. When fraud is more prevalent in 
competitive elections, efforts at manipulating the vote may come from centralized and 
well organized national parties. When fraud is determined more by local characteristics 
than by competitiveness, local elites may be the driving force behind electoral 
manipulation.
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CHAPTER IV
ELECTION FRAUD IN RUSSIA
Historically elections in Russia have been notorious for fraud. The traditions of 
ballot box stuffing and voter intimidation that defined Soviet era elections have segued 
into the “democratization” of the early 1990s. In the modern era, Russia has failed to 
transform into a truly competitive democracy. Elections in Russia have seldom been truly 
competitive, for a number of reasons. Given the nation’s limitations on speech and 
demonstration, political debates rarely feature the establishment candidate and are often 
aired at low-audience times of day. Additionally, some political parties exist only to 
create the illusion of competition and to take votes from other opposition parties (Wilson 
2005). Ultimately, a high degree of electoral fraud prevails.
Elections are plagued by reports of ballot box stuffing, miscounting of ballots, and 
destruction of votes for the opposition (e.g., Bader 2012). In this chapter, I look at 
elections to the national Duma and Presidential elections from 2007 through 2012. 
Outright election fraud was less prevalent during the 1990s and early 2000s (Myagkov et 
al. 2009; Wilson 2005, p. xv;). Instead of increasing legitimacy and democratization 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, conditions point to a steady decline in 
legitimacy and increase in election fraud (Bader 2012). Kalinin and Mebane (2011) find 
patterns of growing fraud throughout this period. Beginning in 2007, it appears that 
election fraud became a problem not only in the ethnic republics and rural areas, but 
across the nation. Public outrage at this level of fraud increased dramatically following 
the 2011 elections. This outrage prompted the administration to investigate claims and 
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begin to incorporate some reforms, but such efforts appear to have had little to no effect 
on the degree of election fraud taking place. The Central Election Commission remains a 
partisan entity and local elites still have incentives to falsify vote counts. As a result, no 
significant improvements have been made. Russia does not appear any closer to a 
democracy following the 2012 election than it was in 2007.
Recent elections
In this section I analyze the Duma elections of 2007 and 2011 and the Presidential 
elections of 2008 and 2012. I find that fraud may have decreased in the presidential 
elections of 2012 but is still a persistent and pervasive problem. Election data are 
available from the Central Election Commission (www.cikrf.ru). Population density data 
are available from ArcticStat (www.arcticstat.org).
2007 Legislative Election
The State Duma is the lower house in Russia's legislative body. The 2007 Duma 
election took place during Vladimir Putin's second term in office. Given Putin's 
popularity and success in the 2004 Presidential election, it was anticipated that his United 
Russia party would do well. United Russia ended up winning nearly two thirds of the 
seats in the legislature, giving the Putin administration an almost complete concentration 
of power (Myagkov et al. 2009, p. 119; Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2009).
In addition to stifling opposition during the campaign, outright election fraud 
appears to have played a significant role in the election. Russia is divided into 83 federal 
subjects, including oblasts (administrative subdivisions, or regions, of a republic), 
republics (which are ethnic and nominally autonomous), “krais” (territories, functionally 
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the same as oblasts), and two federal cities (Moscow and Saint Petersburg). In earlier 
elections, fraud was more likely limited to ethnic republics and a few other oblasts 
(Myagkov et al. 2009, p. 122). Beginning with the 2007 Duma election, however, it 
appears that a regime of electoral fraud became thoroughly entrenched.
 Evidence exists of extreme levels of ballot box stuffing across all oblasts (see 
Figure 4.1). Not only does the distribution of turnout have a wide right-hand tail, but 
reveals a large spike at 100% turnout. A more detailed picture can be obtained by looking 
at individual oblasts and republics. Chechnya is undoubtedly one of the most egregious 
examples of irregular data. Turnout is extremely high—close to 100% across precincts. 
The slope coefficient for the regression of absolute support for United Russia on turnout 
is 1.13, while the relative support for United Russia (the expected value for the 
coefficient) is 99.4%. This means that, although United Russia received almost all of the 
votes in Chechnya, that party did better in those precincts where turnout was reported 
closer to 100% (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.1. Turnout across oblasts in 2007.
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Figure 4.2. Turnout in Chechnya in 2007.
As Mygakov et al. (2009) note, the “usual suspects” of Bashkortostan, Dagestan, 
and Tatarstan all look suspicious, as well. However, not all of the irregularities are found 
in ethnic republics. As shown in Figure 4.3, Tyumen Oblast, one of the wealthiest regions 
in Russia, also displays patterns in the data consistent with ballot box stuffing in favor of 
United Russia (UR). Using the “jaws” method, Figure 4.4 shows that the irregularities in 
absolute support and turnout do not appear to be natural. The residuals have a mean that 
is greater than zero at greater than the .01 level of statistical significance, and the 
distribution of residuals shows that rather than a normal distribution, the distribution is 
consistent with ballot box stuffing.
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Figure 4.3. Turnout and absolute support in Tyumen, 2007.
Figure 4.4. Residuals from regressing absolute support for UR on turnout.
Certainly not every federal subject contains irregularities. Vladimir Oblast, for 
example (see Figure 4.5), appears to have a relatively normal distribution of turnout. The 
SSD (sum of squared differences) for each party is close to zero.
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Figure 4.5. Turnout and absolute support in Vladimir, 2007.
2008 Presidential Election
Term limits prevented Putin from running for president again in 2008. Instead, the 
UR ticket featured his hand-picked successor Dmitry Medvedev. Criticisms regarding the 
uneven playing field seen in the 2007 Duma election resurfaced. One example includes 
the UR candidate refusing to debate the opposition, and debates being aired at odd hours.
Medvedev won the election handily. The irregularities in the data from the 2008 
Presidential election are very similar to those seen in the 2007 Duma election. While 
fraud may not have altered the outcome of the election, it was certainly pervasive. Figure 
4.6 shows that the distribution of turnout at the national level is consistent with  an 
extreme degree of ballot box stuffing. My findings here are consistent with those found 
by Lukinova et al. (2011), namely that “the level of fraud ... is incontrovertible and that 
the concept of 'Russian Democracy' remains an oxymoron” (p. 620). The authors find that 
fraud is more severe than in 2004, and that fraud continues to spread.
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Figure 4.6. Turnout in Russia's 2008 presidential election. All oblasts.
Looking at individual oblasts, we see patterns consistent with a high degree of 
fraud in favor of the UR candidate Dmitry Medvedev. One of the most egregious 
examples is found in the ethnic republic of Mordovia (see Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.7. Turnout and absolute support in Mordovia.
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Similar irregularities are found in many of the ethnic republics, but also in other 
regions. Tyumen again appears particularly egregious with masses of districts reporting 
near 100% turnout, and near 100% support for Medvedev. Belgorod (see Figure 4.8) is 
another example of an oblast with very suspicious irregularities.
Figure 4.8. Turnout and absolute support in Belgorod.
Yet not all regions appear so irregular. Murmansk is a particularly interesting case 
(see Figure 4.9). Despite the fact that the distribution of turnout appears consistent with 
ballot box stuffing, the SSD for each party is close to zero. Furthermore, the absolute 
support for each candidate appears normally distributed, suggesting that significant ballot 
box stuffing did not occur. A more reasonable explanation for the high number of 
precincts reporting 100% turnout may be the high number of precincts with only a 
handful of registered voters, where achieving complete turnout is more likely.
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Figure 4.9. Turnout and absolute support in Murmansk.
2011 Legislative Election
Despite the fact that United Russia lost its two-thirds majority in the Duma in the 
2011 elections, evidence of election fraud was abundant. Perhaps most importantly, 
several videos featuring alleged fraud were displayed online. These amateur videos 
showed individuals loading multiple ballots into ballot boxes. The appearance of now 
familiar issues of fraud in the 2011 Duma election sparked a widespread protest 
movement. The UR’s declining popularity and further evidence of fraud may have 
contributed to the initiation of these rallies.
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The Medvedev administration was quick to downplay the impact of fraud, but 
called for investigation and, ultimately, for reform. Although establishment officials 
argued that fraud had little or no impact on the elections, the data shows irregularities 
similar to those seen in the previous Duma elections (see Figure 4.10).
Figure 4.10. Turnout across all regions.
In terms of the SSD values, the top five regions are among the usual suspects: 
Mordovia, Tyumen, Mari El, Belgorod, and Tamal-Nenets. The patterns across these two 
elections are strikingly similar. The correlation coefficient for the SSD for United Russia 
is .683. While many of the ethnic republics have irregularities in their data, the patterns 
are not confined to ethnic republics or to more rural oblasts. In some oblasts, such as 
Bryansk, the 2011 election appears to be slightly more fraudulent than the Duma election 
in 2007 (see Figure 4.11). The mean value of the SSD for United Russia in 2007 was .
495; in 2011 it was .596. A t test for the difference of means indicates that they are not 
different at the .1 level of significance, suggesting that increases in fraud, if any, were 
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slight. This outcome also suggests that the lower vote total for the UR party was not due 
to any significant decrease in fraud, but due to legitimately lower levels of support.
Figure 4.11. Bryansk, 2007 and 2011.
2012 Presidential Election
Following the public outcry in response to fraud in the 2011 Duma election and 
the ballot box rebuke of United Russia, the stage was set for potential change in the 2012 
Presidential election. Although the returning Putin remained the unquestioned favorite, 
measures were taken to improve transparency. Most notably, webcams were installed in 
virtually every polling place at a cost of several hundred million dollars (Bratersky 2012). 
Despite the public outrage over the rampant fraud and these new efforts at reform, 
it appears that fraud remained entrenched in Russia's electoral system (see Figure 4.12). 
Observers continued to report brazen ballot box stuffing and other illegitimate practices 
(Barry and Schwirtz 2012). The data are consistent with this account. The irregular 
patterns in the data are similar to those seen in the previous fraudulent elections.
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Figure 4.12. Turnout across all regions.
The regions which appear most problematic by SSD value include many of the 
same regions that had irregularities in previous elections: Chechnya, Mordovia, Tyumen, 
Yamal-Nenets, Chuckchi, and Tararstan have the highest SSD values for Putin.
While the average SSD for the UR candidate did not decrease, some areas showed 
improvements. Belgorod, for example, looks much cleaner than it did in 2008 (see Figure 
4.13). 
Despite this improvement, overall there is no indication that fraud was 
significantly reduced in the 2012 election. Despite the efforts at curbing practices such as 
ballot box stuffing, the data still contain many irregularities.
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Figure 4.13. Belgorod in 2012.
The Urban-Rural Divide
One of the most significant dimensions in Russian politics is the urban-rural 
divide (Berezkin et al. 1999). Putin and United Russia enjoy their greatest levels of 
support in small towns and rural areas, whereas the opposition is usually strongest in 
urban centers (see Figure 4.14). If higher turnout is more likely in those rural areas that 
support Putin, the irregularities in the data may be naturally occurring rather than the 
result of fraud.
Using both the jaws technique and the residual analysis technique we can 
determine that the irregularities in the data are not due to natural non-normality caused by 
the urban-rural divide (see Figure 4.15). Using the jaws method, we notice that the data is 
shifted away from natural patterns in a way consistent with ballot box stuffing. After 
regressing absolute support for Putin on turnout within each oblast, analysis of the 
residuals reveals that they tend to be positive at high levels of turnout. The mean residual 
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is greater than zero at more than the .01 level of significance. The distribution reveals a 
larger than expected concentration of residuals slightly larger than 0. This is consistent 
with the results observed at the oblast level previously analyzed in this chapter.
Figure 4.14. Residuals from the absolute support and turnout relationship.
This result is confirmed through residual analysis (see Figure 4.14). Regressing 
population density on turnout results in residuals that have a wide right-hand tail. This is 
consistent with ballot box stuffing, controlling for population density.
Figure 4.15. Residual analysis for the 2012 election. Oblast level data.
63
The urban-rural divide does not explain the irregularities observed in the data, and 
at the oblast level this divide does not explain the degree of fraud observed, either. Given 
our predictions in Chapter 3, we might suspect that there is a nonlinear relationship 
between urbanization and fraud. In very rural oblasts, Putin and UR may enjoy enough 
support that there is little room or need for fraud. In very urban oblasts, the costs of fraud 
may be too high. In Moscow, for example, Putin enjoys little support. Attempts at fraud 
there may be readily caught and seriously protested by the populace and the opposition. 
Fraud may therefore be more prevalent in regions where urbanization is close to the 
mean. The data does not support this conclusion. It appears that the level of fraud is 
independent of the level of urbanization. Regression results are included in Appendix D.
Conclusion
In response to public pressure, political elites in Russia have instituted electoral 
reforms. Some of these are aimed at systemic factors, such as reducing the potential for 
"virtual" candidates and increasing access to media. Some reforms have been aimed at 
reducing outright fraud, such as the installation of webcams. Despite these attempts at 
reform, it appears that election fraud remains a pervasive problem in Russia. The 
irregular patterns observed in the data from the 2007 elections are persistent. These 
patterns can be observed even when controlling for population density, and do not appear 
to be Natural Non-Normality. Nor do they depend on the characteristics of the region in 
question—patterns consistent with fraud are found in both urban and rural areas.
While countries like Mexico have been successful in depoliticizing the 
administration of elections, in Russia the elections are still overseen by partisan elites 
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appointed by those in power. It seems unlikely that election fraud will truly be reduced 
until election officials lose their incentives to report election returns favorable to the 
establishment.
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CHAPTER V
ELECTION FRAUD AND MEXICO'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
Mexico underwent a transition from single party rule to multiparty democracy 
beginning in the late 1980s. Many consider the presidential election of 2000 to be the 
sign that the transition had been completed. This election saw the victory of Vicente Fox, 
the first person to hold the office outside of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI) since the Mexican Revolution. Emerging democracies can be fragile, however. Fox 
won with the opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), one of the PRI's oldest and 
most success rivals. Despite the successes of the PAN, many feared that the new political 
system would be threatened by the old problems of fraud and corruption. Furthermore, 
the PRI party held a position more moderate than either of the main opposition parties. As 
the PRI lost power, new opportunities for internal strife arose between the PAN and the 
Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD).
Given its political monopoly, the PRI enjoyed success largely due to its popularity 
(Magaloni, 2006). This popularity was instrumental in sustaining one-party rule until the 
1980s, when economic difficulties hit the country along with the rest of Latin America. 
The PRI party, finding its support waning, had to resort to massive election fraud in order 
to retain its power. The 1988 presidential election is widely regarded as one of the most 
fraudulent in the nation's history. When the election returns looked bleak for the PRI, the 
computers tallying the votes were shut down. Even the sitting president, Miguel de 
Madrid, has stated that the PRI should have won by a very narrow margin at best, and 
certainly did not earn the massive margin of victory that was ultimately reported 
66
(Thompson, 2004). Ultimately, this election drove up pressure for electoral reform. This 
reform was enacted through several new laws and through increases in election 
monitoring, paving the way for truly competitive elections and the end of the PRI party's 
dominance in the presidential election of 2000.
While the election of 2000 was heralded as a triumph for clean elections, the 
election of 2006 created a great deal of controversy. For the early part of election day, 
election returns showed Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the PRD winning by a 
substantial margin. Felipe Calderón of the PAN gained ground as more polling stations 
reported their results, and pulled ahead as the last polling places reported. Calderón was 
the winner by a very narrow margin. The timing of his comeback win was viewed with 
suspicion and firsthand accounts of election fraud surfaced. Obrador refused to accept the 
election results and demanded a recount. A limited recount was authorized as the PRD 
engaged in large protests. Calderón was ultimately declared the winner of the election by 
less than 250,000 votes. The PRD remained irate and threats of civil unrest called into 
question the stability of Mexico's fledgling democracy.
  The PAN faced a fair amount of public resentment heading into the 2012 
presidential election. The  Calderón administration's war on the drug cartels had resulted 
in massive violence. Economic growth remained sluggish during the global economic 
downturn. The PAN declined in popularity and finished third in the 2012 presidential 
election. The PRI emerged as the winners, with Enrique Peña Nieto earning 38% of the 
vote to Andrés Manuel López Obrador's 32%. Josefina Vázquez Mota of the PAN ended 
up in a distant third with 25% of the vote.
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Again, accusations of fraud plagued the elections. Key among them was 
“Sorianagate,” claims that the PRI purchased gift cards to Soriana grocery stores and 
distributed them to voters in exchange for their vote (Miroff and Booth 2012). Opponents 
argued that vote-buying was widespread and that the election had no legitimacy. The 
Alianza Cívica, a watchdog group, issued a report indicating that vote buying and 
coercions were major problems in the election (Alianza Cívica, 2012).
Despite allegations of fraud, analysis of the 2006 and 2012 Presidential elections 
suggests that the elections were relatively clean and free of fraud. It does not appear that 
the impact of electoral reform has diminished in Mexico. 
Election Fraud in Mexico
Election fraud has occurred at varying levels throughout the PRI regime. It was so 
endemic that the party's candidate in the 1940 election ran on a platform of reducing 
fraud and overseeing clean elections, only to have his election marked as one of the most 
fraudulent in the nation's history (Cothran, 1994, p. 44). Fraud likely peaked again in the 
1988 election. Fraud continued after this election despite efforts to minimize it. Nearly 
every strategy of altering vote counts has been tried by “electoral alchemists” at every 
level of elections.
One of the most prevalent types of election fraud is “vote inflation,” increasing 
the vote count for a particular candidate. This is commonly known as “stuffing the ballot 
box.” In Mexico this is done in two ways. The simplest method is known as the “taco,” 
where extra ballots are just folded together and shoved into the ballot box (Cothran, 1994, 
pp. 199-200). In a method that is both more complicated and more colorful, establishment 
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party supporters are loaded into a bus and driven from one voting center to another. The 
“raton loco” (or “crazy mouse”) drops them off, they vote, and then they board the bus 
for another location to vote again (Cothran, 1994, p. 200).
An alternative to increasing the votes for one candidate is reducing votes for 
another. Reports abound of discarded ballots during Mexican elections. Piles of ballots 
have been found in trash cans and creek beds (Cothran, 1994, p. 202). This has been 
practiced as recently as the 2006 presidential election, when PRD party supporters have 
argued that the PRD influenced the outcome of the election. There are other, less direct 
means of reducing vote counts for a rival candidate. Voter repression can be done by 
making it more difficult for opposition supporters to vote or, in extreme cases, by 
threatening violence. The PRI government employed tactics to make registration difficult 
in regions that had previously supported opposition candidates (Cothran, 1994, p. 198).
A third type of election fraud is the switching of votes from one candidate to 
another. This could be achieved by “buying votes,” by paying voters to vote for a 
particular candidate. Based on historical evidence, ballot box stuffing and the destruction 
of votes appear to be much more common practices. Still, reports of vote buying have 
surfaced as recently as the 2000 election (Frohling and Gallaher 2001, p. 1). Vote buying 
was believed to be a major factor in the elections of 2009 and 2012 (Alianza Cívica 
2012).
Electoral Reforms
Due to the prevalence of fraud in Mexican elections, reform was a major focus 
during the transitionary period. These reforms took shape in a variety of ways and were 
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spread out over a decade. They were largely inspired by the 1988 presidential election. 
Following that election, pressure for electoral reform increased dramatically.
In 1990, the Chamber of Deputies passed the Código Federal de Instituciones y 
Procedimentos Electorales (COFIPE) and formed the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE). 
Opponents argued that the reform did not go far enough and that it provided more 
political power to the PRI (Beer 2003, p. 187-189). In spite of these concerns, the bill 
passed with support from the PAN, and provided a first step towards addressing the 
problem of electoral fraud. Though the IFE had limited power and independence, there 
now existed a body for monitoring elections. Critics argued that the law left too much 
power in the hands of the government. The PRI maintained a strong presence within the 
IFE. The president of the IFE was the Secretary of the Interior, and membership on the 
board was based on representation in congress and on Presidential appointment (Klesner 
1997). Further reforms in 1994 addressed this issue by granting independence to the IFE 
(Levy and Bruhn 1999, p. 545; Magaloni 2005, p. 124). Magaloni argues that the PRI had 
good reason to believe that it would win the election handily, and that it therefore offered 
this critical piece of election reform in order to appease the Zapatista rebellion (Magaloni, 
2006). The 1994 reforms saw the board members representing the political parties lose 
their votes and the Presidential appointments replaced by “citizen councilors” who were 
selected by all three major parties (Klesner 1997). When the time came for the 1994 
elections, several organizations came together to form the Alianza Cívica (Hellinger, 
2011, pp. 267-268). This group organized to monitor elections beginning in 1994, which 
were won by the PRI party candidate Ernesto Zedillo.
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These electoral reforms led to the perception that the 1994 presidential election 
was largely free from fraud. Most believe that Zedillo would have won the election 
regardless of the reported incidents of fraud (Peeler, 2004, p. 76). Reform continued 
during the Zedillo administration. A 1995 pact between the PRI and PAN parties was 
another step towards making elections more legitimate (Peeler, 2004, p. 77). Key among 
the reforms during Zedillo's presidency was the continued independence of the IFE. In 
1996 the IFE was granted even more independence (Levy and Bruhn 1999, p. 545)
It is arguably these reforms, combined with the PRI's emphasis on maintaining 
popular support through elections, that led to the emergence of competitive democracy in 
Mexico. The election of Vicente Fox in 2000 was heralded as the cleanest ever in modern 
Mexico, and was the crowning moment in Mexico's transition from one-party hegemony 
to a competitive democracy. Throughout the reform era, however, critics argued that the 
new rules did not go far enough or that they maintained the establishment's grip on 
power. Following the 2006 presidential election, multiparty democracy appeared to be 
fragile as the results were decried as illegitimate by the opposition and civil unrest ran 
high. The legitimacy of the 2012 Presidential election was likewise questioned despite 
efforts at further reform.
Election Analysis
Data for Mexico’s presidential elections is available through the IFE. Income data 
come from Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI, www.inegi.org.mx). 
The data illustrates the effectiveness of electoral reform. Turnout data is available at the 
district level for the 2000, 2006, and 2012 elections. These turnout distributions show that 
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while the 2000 election appears relatively clean, the 2006 election showed a marked 
improvement (see Figure 5.1). Regarding the relative support for the PAN, the most 
successful opposition party, patterns in its relative support appear which are consistent 
with vote destruction as recently as 1994. This shift is evident from the large spike near 
0% relative support (see Figure 5.2). This irregularity suggests that there may have been a 
large number of polling places where all votes for the PAN were discarded. As reforms 
took place, this phenomenon decreases and then disappears, illustrated by the leveling off 
of this spike in the 2000 election and disappearing by 2006.
Figure 5.1. Turnout 2000, 2006
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Figure 5.2. Relative support for the PAN, 1994-2006
Analysis of the election data for 2006 in closer detail reveals few irregularities. 
Turnout appears to be normally distributed in all but one of the 32 federal entities. 
Absolute support also appears to be normal, suggesting that there were no large-scale 
occurrences of fraud. I perform statistical tests for skewness on a sample of 100 polling 
places, examining turnout and absolute support for each candidate. The results of these 
tests are reported in Table 5.1.  The p value indicates the degree of confidence with which 
we can reject the null hypothesis of a symmetric distribution. If the p value is very small, 
the distribution is weighted in one direction or another, and we have an irregular pattern. 
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If the p value is .01 or greater, we cannot reject the null and the data is consistent with 
data from a clean election. Basically, a small p value (.01 or less) means increased 
likelihood of fraud. Also in the table is the sum of squared differences (SSD) between a 
candidate's relative support and the slope coefficient from the regression of absolute 
support on turnout. As noted earlier, we expect that the relationship between those two 
variables should be equal to the candidate's relative support. In order to measure how 
large the difference is between our expectations given a clean election and the actual vote 
returns, I take the difference between the two and square it. The values for the SSDs are 
fairly small. These results illustrate that increased turnout did not typically help or hurt 
any given candidate, suggesting that there was not widespread vote inflation or vote 
destruction. 
Despite the fact that the patterns in the 2006 Mexican presidential election appear 
much more regular than those found in Russia and analyzed in chapter 4, Several areas 
show interesting irregularities requiring further analysis. Several states fail the tests for 
skewness in each of three key areas: turnout, absolute support for the PAN, and absolute 
support for the PRD. In order to determine if the patterns are consistent with serious 
levels of fraud, I will analyze those areas in more detail.
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Table 5.1. Results of tests for skewness and sum-of-squared-differences (SSD). 2006 General election
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State P-value, Turnout P-value for PAN P-value for PRI P-value for PRD SSD PRI SSD PAN SSD PRD
Aguascalientes 0.1748695 0.0001034 0.7990565 0.0167008 0.0849004 0.1062451 2.09e-06
Baja California 0.1087076 0.0076445 2.30e-06 0.0329218 0.0117786 0.0353563 0.0061756
Baja California Sur 0.4129414 2.39E-009 0.9604654 0.0695551 0.0001218 0.0021644 0.0008079
Campeche 0.3359162 0.8518066 0.0001253 0.6811587 0.0114953 0.0001476 0.0350149
Coahuila 0.1036673 0.0042776 6.42e-13 1.23e-07 0.1012917 0.1353589 0.0008468
Colima 0.7315931 0.1238657 1.88e-09 3.00e-07 0.0208428 0.0384577 0.0017638
Chiapas 0.3084353 6.65e-06 0.0011187 0.8681015 0.0110855 0.0004673 0.0090823
Chihuahua 8.10e-14*** 0.0003674 0 9.83e-06 0.0317414 0.075949 0.0057144
Mexico City 0.3291038 1.30e-07 0.9590139 1.15e-07 0.0006708 0.5197712 0.4597674
Durango 0.0494891* 0.0478002 8.88e-15 0.0537876 0.0465403 0.030296 0.0034391
Guanajuato 0.4373647 0.9729945 0.0011679 0.0017837 0.024521 0.1241726 0.0259871
Guerrero 0.0023338** 2.48e-10 7.98e-06 2.21e-09 0.0017103 0.0039799 0.0003978
Hidalgo 0.777334 0.0492698 3.45e-12 0.7039589 0.0088734 0.013465 8.82e-07
Jalisco 0.1630925 0.004917 1.60e-07 0.8186808 0.0661156 0.1059861 0.0013112
Chimalhuacan 0.0001775*** 7.67e-08 0.0000157 0.111313 0.0539918 0.38506 0.1295589
Cuernavaca 0.0408236 0.0004489 2.35e-13 0.0044462 0.0220182 0.1690082 0.0637571
Morelos 0.9079623 0.001828 4.57e-07 0.0330354 0.030644 0.0785001 0.0029434
Nayarit 0.0109863* 0.000036 1.80e-09 0.0323849 0.0002807 0.0018362 0.0030118
Nuevo Leon 0.6532347 0.0311044 0.0002182 0.0000203 0.2747871 0.4758982 0.0083774
Oaxaca 0.0610253 4.00e-15 2.61e-08 0.1705573 0.0150221 0.0013634 0.0019563
Puebla 0.2901594 0.2881085 0.0002446 0.0615274 0.0734063 0.1273675 0.0062859
Querétaro 5.77e-11*** 0.3812663 7.40e-10 0.0088344 0.1222339 0.1190585 0.0009588
Quintana Roo 0.0670164 0.0013132 5.87e-08 0.0000278 0.0792577 0.0003326 0.056732
San Luis Potosi 0.1702349 0.8167412 0.0000205 0.0066832 0.0010293 0.0013615 0.0006317
Sinaloa 0.5461032 0.2010081 0.0002741 0.2486984 0.0063389 0.0088434 0.0001392
Sonora 0.5461068 0.2198139 9.11e-09 0.010997 0.0040777 0.0107616 0.0190659
Tabasco 0.7425913 1.61e-08 0.2161954 0.7105193 0.0101278 0.0007969 0.0257461
Tamaulipas 0.0325431* 7.78e-06 6.17e-13 0.005429 0.0066738 0.0000422 0.0031127
Tlaxcala 0.2121896 0.00208 0.0066369 0.2894216 1.18e-06 0.0079512 0.006335
Veracruz 0.5573177 0.046949 0.001589 0.095877 0.0012619 0.0001254 0.0010132
Yucatán 0.5327845 0.0444302 1.83e-07 4.58e-07 0.00084 0.0252077 0.0072643
Zacatecas 0.0201637* 0.8877282 1.54e-09 1.74e-07 0.0009617 0.0008189 0.0000348
Several of the states which failed a skewness test illustrate an interesting problem with 
this measure. Since absolute support cannot fall below zero, the distribution of absolute 
support may be truncated. In this case the distribution is asymmetric due to the left-hand 
tail being lopped off at zero rather than a shift in the data caused by vote manipulation. 
This can be seen in the cases of Coahuila, Guerrero, and Cuernavaca (see Figure 5.3). In 
these cases, we may look at relative support instead of absolute support. Relative support 
will be higher than absolute support, since nonvoters are not counted. This will move the 
entire distribution to the right, avoiding truncation problems.
Figure 5.3. Truncated absolute support versus relative support.
Of the four other states which have particularly suspicious results on the skewness 
tests, Tamaulipas has distributions which actually appear fairly normal to the eye. In this 
case, the skewness test might be too sensitive, as the distributions may not be perfectly 
symmetric but are certainly far from what we see when fraud is widespread. Quintana 
Roo has distributions of turnout and absolute support that are somewhat irregular, but are 
not clearly shifted in one direction or another. The relationship between absolute support 
76
0
1
2
3
4
5
De
ns
ity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Absolute Support - PAN
Coahuila
0
1
2
3
4
De
ns
ity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Relative Support - PAN
Coahuila
and turnout does not indicate vote inflation or destruction. Chihuahua and Nayarit, 
however, are interesting cases. 
In Chihuahua (see Figure 5.4), the distribution of absolute support for the PAN 
has a wide right-hand tail. Absolute support for the PRD appears normal. Turnout appears 
roughly normal, but does have a slight weighting on the right-hand tail, which would lead 
us to expect vote inflation for the PAN, but no alteration of PRD votes. This appears to be 
confirmed by regressing absolute support on turnout in the region. The coefficient for the 
PAN is .765, while its relative support in the state is only .427. 
A clearer picture can be obtained by looking at the individual districts within the 
state. When looking at the distribution of support for the PAN, the city of Juarez displays 
an irregular pattern where the rest of the state appears fairly normal. 
Figure 5.4. Juarez and Chihuahua state, 2006
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In Nayarit (see Figure 5.5), turnout appears to be relatively normal. Nonetheless, 
the right-hand tail on the distributions of support for the PAN is wide as is the left-hand 
tail for the distributions of support for the PRD. This outcome is consistent with minor 
vote switching from the PRD to the PAN. These irregularities are fairly minor, however, 
and do not suggest widespread fraud. Still, they are enough to raise alarm bells. Future 
research should examine this region more closely.
Figure 5.5. Turnout and support in Nayarit, 2006
Another state of particular note is the state of Aguascalientes (see Figure 5.6), 
which was treated with particular suspicion during the recount. Despite scrutiny, the data 
does not present any irregularities in this state. The distributions for turnout and absolute 
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support appear fairly normal. Absolute support for the PAN does have a little extra width 
on the right side, and absolute support for the PRD appears more normal. This 
distribution might suggest vote inflation, except that turnout appears normal. Widespread 
vote inflation is therefore unlikely in this case.
Figure 5.6. Turnout and absolute support in Aguascalientes, 2006
The results of the 2012 presidential election likewise display few irregularities. 
Turnout for the nation as a whole appears normally distributed. Absolute and relative 
support also appear normal. Skewness measures for each state are low in magnitude. If 
vote buying or voter intimidation occurred, they were likely at fairly low levels. This 
suggests that, counter to the Alianza Civica's report, the problems in Mexico's elections 
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are likely declining rather than intensifying.
The Alianza Civica reports that voter intimidation and violation of secret ballot 
laws may have occurred in Mexico state, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Jalisco (Alianza Civica 
2012, p. 3). In these states, Alianza Civica reported that children were used to spy on 
voters. Media reports indicated that the PRI had given voters gift cards to the Soriana 
grocery chain in an effort to buy their votes. These reports appear most common in 
Mexico state, the Federal District, San Luis Potosi, and Monterrey (see Figure 5.7). The 
skewness measures for support for the PRI are presented in Table 5.2. Despite the 
allegations, few irregularities are present in these states. While the distribution of support 
in Chihuahua appears suspicious, the other states have much less skewness. This data 
suggests that reported vote stealing or intimidation were either limited in scope or 
unsuccessful. 
Figure 5.7. Relative support for the PRI in Mexico state and the Federal District.
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Table 5.2. Relative support in regions with reported vote buying
State Mean, relative 
support for PRI
Skewness, Relative 
support for PRI
Chihuahua .377 1.185
Federal District .184 .765
Jalisco .314 .712
Mexico State .325 .904
Nuevo Leon .280 .459
San Luis Potosi .296 .878
Sinaloa .382 1.086
Although Chihuahua appears to have a skewed distribution for the PRI's relative 
support, this distribution is mitigated to some extent when controlling for income (see 
Figure 5.8). Data on GDP per capita is available at the municipal level. 
Figure 5.8. Relative support for the PRI in Chihuahua, residuals from regressing on 
GDP per capita.
Conclusion
For most of the twentieth century, democracy in Mexico was characterized by 
single-party rule. Elections were used by the PRI as a means of legitimizing and 
cementing their power. Popular support and the ability to deliver favorable election 
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returns by controlling the electoral process contributed to the regime's stability. The 
problems of the 1980s ultimately forced the PRI to change its approach. Multiple factors 
led to the establishment of clean elections. After the 1988 elections, public pressure for 
electoral reform was very high (Cothran, 1994, p. 187; Hellinger, 2011, p. 267). Leading 
up to the 1994 elections, the Zapatista uprising put additional pressure on the PRI. 
Confident that it could win the election, and wanting to stem violence, the party agreed to 
further electoral reforms that included granting independence to the IFE (Magaloni, 
2006). Given the emphasis on elections as a foundation of the party's power and 
legitimacy, the PRI had “raised the cost of blatant electoral fraud” (Levy and Bruhn 1999, 
p. 546). The sweeping electoral reforms of the 1990s resulted in a dramatic reduction in 
fraud and paved the way for an opposition candidate to win the presidency. When Vicente 
Fox won the office in 2000, it appeared that Mexico's transition to a competitive 
democracy had been successful.
Still, democracy in Mexico has undergone many challenges. Although presidential 
elections have become much more legitimate, corruption and fraud remain in many areas 
and at lower levels of government (Lawson 2000). Additionally, the competitiveness of 
elections is still limited by access to resources, and campaign finance reform has been 
difficult (Eisenstadt and Poiré 2005). Perhaps more ominously, the 2006 election was 
marred by controversy. When PRD candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador lost his 
large lead in the closing hours of the election, suspicions were raised. Allegations and 
firsthand reports of election fraud fueled tensions, and the legitimacy and stability of 
Mexican democracy came into doubt. While massive civil unrest was avoided, the 
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fledgling system clearly remained fragile.
The 2012 elections resulted in similar accusations. The outrage following these 
elections was less intense than that which followed the 2006 elections, likely due to the 
fact that the PRI won by a large number of votes. Still, given the PRI's history of vote 
fraud, suspicions were high.
Despite the allegations, it appears that both the 2006 and 2012 elections were 
clean and that electoral reform has been successful. No evidence exists of widespread 
election fraud. In comparison to places where fraud is pervasive and ongoing, such as in 
Russia, all of the critical distributions appear normal. The 2006 elections appear to be 
even more legitimate than the vaunted elections of 2000 that first established multiparty 
democracy. Given the sensitivity of the forensic techniques and the closeness of the 
election, however, the possibility that minor amounts of election fraud were present and 
affected the outcome cannot be ruled out. In contrast, the margin of victory for the PRI in 
2012 suggests that any minor election fraud which did take place did not alter the result. 
Doubts about Mexico's democracy following these  elections are unfounded, and efforts 
for further reform should focus on problems that still exist.
While Mexico still faces serious obstacles in its effort to develop democracy, there 
does not appear to be any “backsliding.” The data from the last three elections should 
lead to increased confidence. Given the damage done to the electoral system's credibility, 
the stakes for the next election are very high. To further complicate the situation, Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador is making another run, and public opinion polls indicate that the 
race may be close once again.
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CHAPTER VI
ELECTION FRAUD AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT DURING 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REDEMPTION IN THE U.S. SOUTH
Historically, election fraud has played a large role in American politics. In this 
chapter I analyze presidential elections during the Reconstruction and Redemption eras in 
the U.S. South. The consensus in the literature is that this period was marked by 
widespread fraud in virtually every form.
I find evidence that the historical accounts are accurate. During Reconstruction 
(1867-1877) which followed the U.S. Civil War, Democrats engaged in fraud, likely at 
local levels where they held more power. Nearly a decade after Reconstruction had 
ceased, Democrats in the South were able to institute legal measures, such as poll taxes 
and literacy tests, to suppress the vote for the opposition. The irregularities in the data are 
primarily found in the Deep South states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, 
and South Carolina. Unsurprisingly, these are also the states where restrictive voting laws 
were first adopted and enforced (Kousser 1974). While other forms of fraud were no 
doubt common, vote destruction appears to have been the primary means for the 
Democrats to engage in electoral manipulation in the South.
The efficacy of election fraud and voter intimidation tactics in the South is 
unclear. Key (1949) argues that the disenfranchisement of black voters and the 
establishment of one-party rule predated the codification of suffrage restricting laws. 
Terry (2013) points out that the effects of lynching as a means of violent vote suppression 
are not so clear. Empirical research is ambiguous, and the author finds only weak 
84
evidence that lynching increased Democratic vote shares (Terry 2013, p. 33). Kousser 
(1974) takes direct issue with Key's thesis, arguing that the establishment of antisuffrage 
laws such as poll taxes and literacy tests played a vital role in suppressing the black vote 
and creating the solid South.
This chapter uses election forensics to contribute to this debate. I attempt to 
measure the impact of vote manipulation before and after the institution of suffrage 
restricting laws and find that vote suppression was pervasive prior to the establishment of 
these laws. While the patterns consistent with vote destruction become stronger as these 
laws come into effect, Key appears to be correct in his assertion that black voters were 
suppressed by other means well in advance of tactics such as poll taxes and literacy tests.
In addition, the case of the U.S. South allows me to test the tools developed in 
Chapter 2 on a case where fraud may have been even more pervasive than in the cases of 
Russia or Mexico. The legalization of electoral malpractice found in the U.S. South may 
have been more extreme than the electoral authoritarian regimes analyzed elsewhere in 
this dissertation.
Previous Research
Campbell (2005) provides accounts of election fraud throughout American 
history. The most visible form of election fraud in the South during the Reconstruction 
and Redemption eras was voter intimidation (Campbell 2005, pp. 58-72). The Ku Klux 
Klan regularly engaged in both threats and actual violence. Other more direct methods 
were also employed to suppress the black vote. Illegal poll taxes were enforced against 
blacks, and votes cast for Republicans were discarded (Campbell 2005, p. 62).
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Election fraud in the South was extremely pervasive. In the 1872 presidential 
election, the electoral votes for both Louisiana and Arkansas were thrown out due to 
irregularities. The infamous 1876 presidential election was likewise marred by extreme 
election fraud (Campbell 2005, pp. 66-71). The Republican vote was suppressed or stolen 
across the South, and the Republican party responded by using its control of the election 
boards to alter the result.
Over time, systemic changes caused the nature of fraud to change. Once 
Reconstruction had ended, Southern states fought off attempts to have elections 
monitored by the federal government (Campbell 2005, pp. 92-93). As federal oversight 
decreased, Southern states began to add the strategy of disenfranchisement to the toolbox 
of electoral manipulation. Literacy tests and poll taxes began to be used to suppress the 
African-American vote in a form of vote destruction. At the same time, vote buying was a 
common practice in the late 1800s, in which voters were paid in an effort to steal votes 
from the opposition and inflate vote totals (Argersinger 1985-1986, p. 673). Key (1949) 
argues that the methods employed in the 1880's successfully solidified the South as a one-
party regime.
Kousser (1974) offers an in-depth look at the system of disenfranchisement which 
came to dominate the South in the final decades of the 19th century. Once Reconstruction 
ended and Democrats were able to regain more control of their state governments, they 
began to introduce legislation explicitly aimed at reducing votes for the Republican party, 
whether those came from white or black voters. Kousser asserts that it was these laws that 
had the greatest impact in disenfranchising the Southern Democrats' opposition. 
86
Analysis
In order to examine the nature of electoral manipulation in the South, I look at 
county level data on turnout and vote shares in presidential elections. This data is 
available from the ICPSR (Clubb 2006). I also include demographic information from the 
U.S. Census Bureau, also available from the ICPSR (Haines 2010).
Reconstruction Era Elections
According to Foner (1988), “1872 witnessed the most peaceful election of the 
entire Reconstruction period” (p. 508). Republicans performed well in the South, 
prompting the party to claim that “in a peaceful election, they constituted the South's 
natural voting majority” (Foner 1988, p. 508). To the extent that there had been fraud, it 
possibly benefited the Republicans rather than the Democrats. Louisiana and Arkansas 
both sent electors for Grant, but their electoral votes were nullified by Congress.
Metrics indicate that this election had few irregularities (see Figure 6.1). Both 
turnout and relative support for the Democratic candidate are relatively normal. Turnout 
for Grant has a mean of 62.5% with skewness of -.29. Mean relative support for Greeley 
was 51.7% with skewness of .159.
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Figure 6.1. Turnout and relative support for Greeley (D) in Southern states in 1872
In contrast to the election of 1872, 1876 saw one of the most controversial 
elections in U.S. history. Events of 1875 had left the Republican party much weaker in 
the South (Foner 1988, p. 569). Democrats increasingly turned to intimidation in an effort 
to suppress the black vote (Foner 1988, p. 570). Evidence suggests that this intimidation 
was effective at the local level. Monroe County, Mississippi, went for Grant in 1868 but 
switched amid “over a thousand affidavits of men who had been driven away from the 
polls in Monroe County by force and threats” (Campbell 2005, p. 67). Still, the 
Republican side had the potential to alter the vote counts and the outcome. As early 
returns showed Tilden as the likely winner, Hayes could be the winner if he were able to 
take South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, states “where the [Republican] party 
controlled the voting machinery” (Foner 1988, p. 575). The Republican party chairman 
sent a telegram to party leaders in those states, asking them to “hold their state.” The end 
result was electoral manipulation in both directions. Republicans felt that violence, 
intimidation, and fraud at local levels cost Hayes the Southern states, while Democrats 
felt that they had been “cheated out of office by Republican office-holders at the state 
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level and in Congress” (Campbell 2005, p. 73). Historians have disagreed over who 
would have won the election had it been conducted legitimately (Campbell 2005, p. 77). 
In the end, the election resulted in the infamous Compromise of 1877 which brought an 
end to Reconstruction.
For this election, the metrics point to some degree of vote destruction in favor of 
the Democrat Tilden. While turnout appears fairly normal, some evidence suggests a 
wide left-hand tail in the distribution (see Figure 6.2). Skewness decreased from that 
observed for the South in the 1872 election, with a skewness of -.47. The change in 
relative support for the Democrat is more noticeable. There is a large spike near 100% 
relative support for Tilden (D). This spike does not appear in the distribution of absolute 
support (which appears fairly normal), suggesting that artificial increases in the Democrat 
vote counts were rare. The irregularity in relative support, therefore, would have been 
caused by vote destruction rather than vote inflation. Support for this hypothesis can be 
seen in the correlation between relative support for Tilden and turnout. The correlation 
coefficient is -.39, suggesting that those counties in which Tilden had high levels of 
support also had low levels of turnout.
The data appears to corroborate the Republican claims that the vote count was 
affected by efforts to intimidate and suppress the Republican vote. Democrats argued that 
Tilden may have won Louisiana, South Carolina, or Florida. This argument is more 
difficult to evaluate due to a low number of observations. Data is available for just 20 
counties in South Carolina, 38 counties in Florida, and 54 parishes in Louisiana. No clear 
patterns emerge in those data.
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Figure 6.2. Turnout, relative and absolute support for Democrats in the Deep South 
(Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, and South Carolina)
Post-Reconstruction Elections
Following the 1876 election, Democrats in the South were poised to reclaim 
power thanks to the withdrawal of federal troops. Prior to the absolute death of 
Reconstruction, Democrats were forced to rely on relatively subtle or indirect methods of 
fraud and disenfranchisement. After it was clear that Reconstruction would not 
recommence, Southern Democrats were able to be more bold (Kousser 1974, pp. 45-46). 
Ballot box stuffing and vote stealing became commonplace during the 1880s (Campbell 
2005, p. 89; Kousser 1974, pp. 46-47).
In 1890, the Lodge Bill aimed to provide more federal oversight and ensure fair 
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elections. When this bill failed, the strategy of disenfranchisement became cemented in 
the South. By 1901 the entire Deep South had laws aimed at restricting the franchise 
(Kousser 1974, p. 239). This systematic disenfranchisement, along with the advent of the 
secret ballot, had serious effects on turnout and votes for the Republican party. Kousser 
estimates that African-American turnout was reduced by an average of 62% and the vote 
shares of opposition parties reduced by an average of 45% in these states during that 
period (Kousser 1974, p. 241). 
Turnout decreases steadily and dramatically following the 1876 election. While 
this is consistent with vote destruction, it may also be part of a larger trend of decreasing 
turnout, due to several potential causes. Burnham (1970) argues that the election of 1900 
was a critical realignment in American politics. This trend in the Deep South predates that 
election. Heckelman (1995) finds that turnout decreased when the secret ballot was 
adopted, even controlling for overall trends in turnout (Heckelman 1995, p. 115). Poll 
taxes and literacy tests had similar effects. These factors may explain more of the radical 
decline we see beginning with the election in 1892. The secret ballot is a means of 
suppressing vote stealing and vote inflation. Poll taxes and literacy tests, on the other 
hand, are essentially means of vote destruction.
Looking at the metrics for fraud, the elections of 1880 and 1884 appear fairly 
regular (see figure 6.3). This would support Kousser's hypothesis that Southern 
Democrats waited to ensure that Reconstruction was truly finished before beginning the 
work of disenfranchising their opposition. Beginning in 1888, we again see a spike in the 
distribution of relative support for the Democratic party at 100% (see Figure 6.4). This 
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spike persists even when using the residual analysis method to control for the percentage 
of the population which is black. This suggests that vote suppression and not race is the 
underlying cause of the irregularity.
Figure 6.3. Absolute and relative support for the Democratic candidate, 1880 and 
1884
In 1888, Georgia was the only Deep South state to have a poll tax (Kousser 1974, 
p. 239). Literacy tests had not been implemented. This lends support to Key's (1949) 
thesis that disenfranchisement was pervasive despite the fact that the legal framework for 
it was not yet in place. Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of relative support for the 
Democratic candidate in the four Deep South states that did not yet have poll taxes. The 
spike at 100% is pronounced, despite the lack of restrictive voting laws.
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Figure 6.4. 1888 Presidential election. Turnout, relative and absolute support for 
Cleveland (D).
Figure 6.5. Relative support for Cleveland (D) in Deep South states 
without disenfranchisement laws.
93
In 1890, Mississippi instituted both a poll tax and literacy tests (Kousser 1974, p. 
239). Despite the fact that Mississippi and Georgia now had laws restricting suffrage, 
relative support for the Democratic candidate in these two states appears more normal 
than in those Deep South states without such laws (see Figure 6.6). This trend lends 
further support to Key's theory. Even in the absence of these laws, vote destruction 
appears significant. The irregularities in the data for Alabama, Louisiana, and South 
Carolina remain when controlling for race.
The irregularities in the data support the conclusion that vote destruction was a 
significant factor in election returns following Reconstruction. The patterns observed in 
the 1876 election disappeared in the elections of 1880 and 1884. They reemerge 
beginning in the 1888 election, when turnout shrinks steadily over time, becoming 
increasingly deflated. Relative support for the Democrats maintains spikes near 100%, 
while absolute support appears unchanged. These increases in relative support are 
correlated with lower levels of turnout and controlling for racial demographics. 
Differences between the Deep South and the other Southern states are also readily 
apparent in the data. In the border states, relative support for the Democratic party 
appears fairly normal (see Figure 6.7). In the Deep South states, however, the suspicious 
spike near 100% is prevalent.
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Figure 6.6. Relative support (D) in Deep South states without 
disenfranchisement laws and with disenfranchisement laws
Figure 6.7. Relative support (D) in the Deep South and the rest of the Confederate 
States in 1900.
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Vote fraud likely took several forms during the Redemption era. While ballot box 
stuffing and other vote inflation and vote stealing tactics were employed, vote destruction 
appears to be the strongest factor in altering election outcomes. Table 6.1 shows metrics 
for vote destruction over time. The patterns associated with vote destruction become 
increasingly apparent in the years spanning 1872 to 1904. Again, the election of 1888 
reveals the beginning of strong patterns of vote suppression. This suppression occurred in 
advance of the widespread adoption of restrictive voting laws. The pattern gets stronger 
as these laws are implemented, suggesting that Key (1949) is correct in asserting that 
disenfranchisement took place even before it was codified into law. Given the continuing 
strength of these patterns, however, Kousser (1974) clearly is correct in asserting that 
these laws did have a serious impact.
Table 6.1. Mean and skewness for turnout and relative support (D) in the Deep 
South. 1872-1904.
Year Mean – 
Turnout
Skewness – 
Turnout
Mean – Relative 
Support (D)
Skewness – Relative 
Support (D)
1872 60.68 -.23 51.135 .141
1876 70.534 -.47 67.618 -.401
1880 52.761 .320 67.63 -.48
1884 47.11 .035 67.557 -.584
1888 45.425 .218 74.984 -.658
1892 46.641 .009* 73.425 -.556
1896 36.578 .307 67.683 -.280*
1900 25.623 1.043 75.056 -.442
1904 22.175 1.369 79.061 -.845
*Symmetric due to bimodality.
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Conclusion
Anecdotal evidence suggests that fraud was rampant in the South during and after 
Reconstruction. During Reconstruction, Democrats in the South were limited in the tools 
available to them, partly because they had very limited power. When Reconstruction 
ended, they were able to disenfranchise their opposition. This disenfranchisement took 
many forms, including extralegal violence and legal codification. Key (1949) argues that 
disenfranchisement existed through intimidation and fraud prior to legal suffrage 
restriction. 
Using election forensics, I find that the irregularities in the data support this 
narrative. Following a fairly clean election in 1872, the fiasco of 1876 led to a period 
when Democrats were able to slowly regain power but were hesitant to engage in drastic 
electoral manipulation. Beginning with the election of 1888, Democrats in the Deep 
South were able to suppress the vote for the Republican party and begin to artificially 
increase their vote shares. Although this occurred before the expansion of suffrage 
restricting laws, the effects become even stronger once these laws spread. I therefore find 
support for the theories of both Key and Kousser. While disenfranchisement was 
pervasive even in the absence of poll taxes or literacy tests, these types of restrictions still 
had a serious impact.
Vote fraud in the U.S. Deep South during the Reconstruction and Redemption eras 
not only carries historical importance, but provides a unique case for election forensics. 
While vote inflation in Russia appears to be the primary means of fraud, the U.S. South 
during Redemption shows us a very different pattern. By employing analysis of support, 
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we can determine that vote destruction was the primary means of electoral fraud. By 
contrasting the U.S. case with those of Russia and Mexico the flexibility of forensic tools 
becomes apparent.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Election forensics is concerned with uncovering irregular patterns in aggregate 
election data. One possible explanation for these observed irregularities is election fraud. 
Just as in diagnosing the cause of a medical condition, several possible “diagnoses” can 
be made concerning symptoms observed in election data. This dissertation aims to 
improve the ability to determine the cause of these observed vote irregularities. 
Tools for Detecting Fraud
In this dissertation I have expanded on the tools available in election forensics in 
two main ways. First, I have developed two simple methods for controlling for other 
variables. These tools allow us to rule out other causes for the symptoms of vote fraud 
that we see. Second, I discuss metrics that can provide insight into the type of vote fraud 
that may have occurred.
One major challenge in election forensics has been that of confounding variables. 
Often clean elections are assumed to have normally distributed turnout or to have 
particular digits in the vote count which follow the distribution of Benford's Law. While 
fraud can cause irregularities in these patterns, so can a number of other factors. Any 
process which alters votes in some areas and not in others could have this effect. 
Increased campaigning, racial demographics, income, or the degree of urbanization are 
all possible examples. The observed non-normality in distributions of turnout or support 
may be natural or legitimate rather than due to fraud.
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Two methods for dealing with this issue have been put forth in this dissertation: 
the “jaws” method and the residual analysis method. The jaws method analyzes the 
relationship between absolute support and turnout. Specifically, this method examines the 
residuals obtained by regressing the former on the latter. I hypothesize that, in a clean 
election, these residuals will be normally distributed. If vote inflation is present, however, 
the data will be shifted in a way that causes the residuals at the high end of turnout to be 
positive for the beneficiary of extra votes, and negative for the victim of vote inflation. 
The benefit of this approach is that it requires no additional data, but is based on patterns 
consistent with ballot box stuffing.
The residual analysis method may provide a clearer picture when additional 
information is available. This method relies on regressing turnout or support on a control 
variable. If the residuals obtained in that regression are normally distributed in the 
absence of fraud, manipulation will cause a shift in these residuals. This shift is due to the 
fact that turnout or support is increased in some districts while the value for the control 
variable is not.
While these two new approaches allow us to rule out alternative explanations for 
irregularities, using new metrics can aid in determining the type of fraud that may drive 
these irregularities. Existing tools are well suited to uncover vote inflation. While they 
can detect vote stealing and vote destruction, other metrics can explore these cases. 
Irregularities in absolute support and relative support can be consistent with any of the 
three types of fraud. Vote manipulation will shift relative support for both candidates in 
much the same way it shifts turnout. In the case of vote stealing, turnout will not be 
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affected at all, so analyzing support is critical for these cases. If the vote counts are 
altered for only one candidate, absolute support for the other will not be altered at all. By 
analyzing levels of support together with turnout, we can determine possible explanations 
for irregularities. Not only can we tell that fraud has occurred, but we can also gain 
information about the nature of that fraud.
Lastly, I adopt two formal models of the behavior of machine parties and election 
officials in regards to vote manipulation. These models are extensions of existing models 
of fraud behavior that offer contrasting views based on the goals of the decision makers. 
First, the macro-level model captures the behavior of national level decision makers. The 
party or a particular candidate may want to engage in only enough fraud to win the 
election in an effort to maintain legitimacy. While there is an advantage to winning an 
election with a solid majority, this tactic acknowledges the need to keep election returns 
within the realm of reason. Second, the micro-level model is taken from Chaves (2009) 
and looks at the decisions of local election officials. While the goal at the national level 
may be to maximize the probability of getting a plurality, local level officials seek to 
maximize the margin of victory for the machine party. They may fear backlash from the 
local populace, but otherwise may engage in as much fraud as possible. This results in 
more fraud in competitive districts, but potentially more fraud overall.
By using these new methods, election forensics can gain a much more complete 
understanding of the patterns in electoral data. As an emerging field, election forensics 
has been primarily concerned with uncovering symptoms. This project aims to help 
explain the root causes of those symptoms.
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Three Stories of Fraud
The second part of this dissertation examined three distinct cases. Russia, Mexico, 
and the United States all have long histories of election fraud. Together they offer a view 
of electoral authoritarian regimes at every stage.
Russia has been unable to shake its issues with election fraud, even after the 
nation's democratic transition. It appears that Putin and United Russia have successfully 
developed an electoral authoritarian regime. Despite attempts at reform, extreme 
irregularities in the data persist. While Putin and his party would likely win elections 
even in the absence of fraud, local elites may have incentives to produce returns that 
show even stronger support. Despite the installation of webcams in every polling place, 
fraud has persisted.
This Russian profile contrasts sharply with Mexico. Although the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) maintained an electoral authoritarian regime for 70 
years, the transition to democracy apparently has not been impeded by widespread fraud 
as in the case of Russia. The reforms in Mexico have been much more successful than 
those in Russia. The key difference between these two nations is the independence of 
election administrators. One of the most important reforms in the Mexican case made the 
central election authority (the Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE) independent of the ruling 
party. Where the board members were appointed by the PRI in the past, beginning in the 
mid 1990s the organization was made increasingly apolitical. Initially, opposition parties 
were given some power in determining the board's membership. As the board gained 
increasing independence, electoral irregularities became less common. In Russia, 
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however, the election officials at every level are still political appointments.
The United States during the eras of Reconstruction and Redemption) offers a 
unique situation in terms of election fraud. While the vote manipulation that went on was 
certainly pervasive, it was also perversely legitimate. An analysis of the transition from 
Reconstruction to Redemption shows the effect of the steady and vast efforts of vote 
destruction. By legally disenfranchising the opposition, Democrats in the South were able 
to skew electoral returns to a much greater degree than any of the ballot box stuffing or 
vote stealing that happened in the region. This approach was made possible only when 
federal oversight disappeared, and federal intervention was required to reverse it.
These cases provide excellent tests of the methods developed in the first part of 
the dissertation. In addition, they provide a theory regarding the genesis and conclusion 
of regimes built on election fraud. Fraud occurs when those counting the ballots are 
political actors. Combating fraud requires changing the incentives for those who count 
the votes. Technologies like webcams, voting machines, and secret ballots have likely had 
some positive effect, but those who wish to manipulate vote counts have always found 
ways around these restrictions. Reform attempts may be more likely to succeed when 
they address the motive rather than the means.
Concluding Remarks
The primary goal of this project has been to make election forensic techniques 
more accurate and applicable. To that end, the major contribution of this dissertation is 
the introduction of tools to control for the presence of confounding variables. Such 
controls are imperative for the veracity of election forensics. In addition, I have aimed to 
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develop a deeper understanding of fraud through the use of formal models and empirical 
cases. Future research should continue to refine these techniques, develop more accurate 
measures of fraud, and evaluate legitimacy in more cases.
The field of election forensics shows great promise.  As emerging democracies 
continue to struggle with problems of electoral legitimacy, election forensics can provide 
an additional tool for election observers and policy makers. While having observers 
operating on the ground level is certainly important, election forensics can offer a broader 
view at a low cost. International pressure can have a tremendous and positive impact on 
electoral legitimacy. Providing a more clear picture of the degree of election fraud present 
in an election may encourage the development of democracy.
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APPENDIX A
SIMULATION PARAMETER VALUES
Voter i's ideal point (xi, yi) is given by:
b1x = -2
b2x = 4 to simulate natural non-normality, 0 otherwise
b1y = -1
σx2 = 2 
σy2 = 2
Voters decide to vote if
b1v = 1
b2v = 4
T = 8
σ12 = 2
σ22 = 2
σ32 = 2
σ42 = 2
M1= 3
M2 = 2
M3 = 4
M4 = 3
Candidate 1's x position was 16, with a y position varying between -10, -6, -4. 
This created elections that were relatively competitive or uncompetitive.
Candidate 2's x position was 11, with a y position of 2.
The probability that fraud occurred for Candidate 1 varied between .2, .35, and .5. 
The probability of fraud was allowed to differ based on whether or not the candidate 
received a majority of the votes cast. All permutations were simulated.
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APPENDIX B
SIMULATION RESULTS
Run Prob Fraud – Low Support Rate of Fraud Type of Fraud
TO Residual 
Skewness
TO Residual Skew 
Postfraud
Absolute Support 
Residual 
Skewness
Absolute Support 
Residual Skew 
post-fraud
NNN
1 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.48 0.48 0.12 0.18 yes
2 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.66 0.65 0.01 0.01 yes
3 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.41 0.41 0.09 0.71 yes
4 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.41 0.41 0.05 0.05 yes
5 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.45 0.45 0.06 0.1 yes
6 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.45 0.46 0.06 0.04 yes
7 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.63 0.63 0.13 0.16 yes
8 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.31 0.31 0.2 0.21 yes
9 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.22 yes
10 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.42 0.42 0.12 0.12 yes
11 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.57 0.57 0.18 0.25 yes
12 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.6 0.59 0.21 0.19 yes
13 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.66 0.66 0.08 0.01 yes
14 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.39 0.39 0.08 0.1 yes
15 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.6 0.6 0.07 0.14 yes
16 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.58 0.57 0.1 0.12 yes
17 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.41 0.41 0.17 0.07 yes
18 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.32 0.32 0.07 0.06 yes
19 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.53 0.53 0.07 0.01 yes
20 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.61 0.57 0.06 0 yes
21 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.6 0.6 0.05 0.03 yes
22 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.51 0.52 0.08 0.03 yes
23 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.62 0.62 0.13 0.03 yes
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24 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.52 0.48 0.01 0.02 yes
25 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.68 0.68 0.17 0.05 yes
26 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.44 0.43 0.16 0.12 yes
27 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.71 0.71 0.17 0.17 yes
28 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.68 0.68 0.21 0.17 yes
29 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.79 0.79 0.17 0.08 yes
30 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.11 yes
31 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.43 0.43 0.17 0.24 yes
32 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.68 0.68 0.05 0 yes
33 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.58 0.58 0.08 0.12 yes
34 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.59 0.58 0.01 0.02 yes
35 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.49 0.49 0.08 0.05 yes
36 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.43 0.42 0.04 0.07 yes
37 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.58 0.58 0.1 0.2 yes
38 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.65 0.63 0.07 0.06 yes
39 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.48 0.48 0.02 0.12 yes
40 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.49 0.49 0.08 0.08 yes
41 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.44 0.44 0.05 0.2 yes
42 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.4 0.37 0.07 0.03 yes
43 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.44 0.44 0.2 0.01 yes
44 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.44 0.43 0.15 0.13 yes
45 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.57 0.57 0.17 0.02 yes
46 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.15 yes
47 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.49 0.49 0.1 0.03 yes
48 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.46 0.44 0.1 0.08 yes
49 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.59 0.59 0.09 0.23 yes
50 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.55 0.54 0.12 0.13 yes
51 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.47 0.47 0.11 0.22 yes
52 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.63 0.63 0.1 0.08 yes
53 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.52 0.52 0.1 0.3 yes
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54 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.63 0.64 0.06 0.05 yes
55 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.59 0.59 0.07 0.3 yes
56 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.3 0.31 0.11 0.13 yes
57 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.76 0.76 0.04 0.41 yes
58 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.83 0.82 0.13 0.13 yes
59 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.46 0.46 0.1 0.31 yes
60 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.51 0.51 0.05 0.05 yes
61 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.6 yes
62 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.38 0.37 0.09 0.07 yes
63 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.63 0.63 0.25 0.53 yes
64 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.53 0.52 0.25 0.25 yes
65 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.72 0.72 0.19 0.43 yes
66 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.38 0.36 0.18 0.2 yes
67 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.52 0.52 0.11 0.21 yes
68 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.55 0.55 0.05 0.07 yes
69 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.43 0.43 0.11 0.24 yes
70 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.76 0.76 0.13 0.12 yes
71 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.47 0.47 0.11 0.25 yes
72 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.55 0.54 0.12 0.13 yes
73 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.71 0.71 0.03 0.22 yes
74 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.98 0.96 0.2 0.18 yes
75 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.42 0.42 0.04 0.28 yes
76 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.33 0.3 0.03 0.01 yes
77 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.85 0.85 0.01 0.23 yes
78 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.48 0.48 0.09 0.09 yes
79 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.61 0.61 0.18 0.43 yes
80 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.5 0.45 0.23 0.21 yes
81 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.46 0.46 0.16 0.36 yes
82 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.4 0.4 0.18 0.13 yes
83 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.47 0.47 0.12 0.42 yes
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84 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.57 0.52 0.16 0.08 yes
85 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.43 0.43 0.04 0.19 yes
86 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.37 0.38 0.11 0.16 yes
87 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.48 0.48 0.06 0.2 yes
88 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.62 0.61 0.21 0.2 yes
89 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.44 0.44 0.08 0.21 yes
90 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.44 0.42 0.07 0.09 yes
91 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.5 0.5 0.12 0.25 yes
92 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.49 0.45 0.05 0.02 yes
93 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.49 0.49 0.03 0.18 yes
94 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.5 0.47 0.11 0.11 yes
95 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 1.1 1.1 0.01 0.15 yes
96 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.52 0.48 0.03 0.01 yes
97 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.21 yes
98 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.51 0.4 0.2 0.09 yes
99 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.63 0.63 0.31 0.34 yes
100 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.41 0.35 0.21 0.2 yes
101 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.44 0.44 0.15 0.25 yes
102 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.48 0.44 0.21 0.12 yes
103 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.53 0.53 0.07 0.13 yes
104 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.48 0.49 0.14 0.08 yes
105 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.08 yes
106 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.44 0.44 0.12 0.16 yes
107 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.28 0.28 0.08 0.11 yes
108 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.54 0.52 0.19 0.29 yes
109 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.62 0.62 0.02 0.48 yes
110 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.57 0.57 0.06 0.04 yes
111 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.46 0.46 0.2 0.7 yes
112 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.64 0.64 0.12 0.12 yes
113 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.49 0.49 0.1 0.64 yes
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114 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.29 0.3 0.03 0.02 yes
115 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.61 0.62 0.23 0.69 yes
116 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.34 0.33 0.23 0.22 yes
117 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.72 0.72 0.25 0.6 yes
118 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.47 0.47 0.15 0.14 yes
119 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.59 0.59 0.22 0.58 yes
120 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.55 0.53 0.09 0.09 yes
121 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.58 0.58 0.18 0.8 yes
122 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.67 0.68 0.11 0.12 yes
123 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.39 0.39 0.02 0.66 yes
124 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.53 0.52 0.09 0.1 yes
125 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.59 0.59 0.03 0.77 yes
126 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.67 0.69 0.13 0.12 yes
127 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.46 0.46 0.08 0.63 yes
128 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.43 0.4 0.15 0.16 yes
129 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.32 0.32 0.02 0.59 yes
130 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.6 0.58 0.05 0.04 yes
131 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.4 0.4 0.07 0.6 yes
132 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.67 0.66 0.04 0.03 yes
133 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.41 0.41 0.14 0.6 yes
134 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.33 0.33 0.18 0.15 yes
135 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.37 0.37 0.16 0.6 yes
136 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.49 0.49 0.24 0.2 yes
137 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.53 0.53 0.14 0.67 yes
138 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.39 0.38 0.24 0.21 yes
139 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.64 0.64 0.07 0.56 yes
140 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.51 0.48 0.08 0.11 yes
141 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.4 0.4 0.12 0.44 yes
142 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.62 0.53 0.09 0.09 yes
143 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.49 0.49 0.05 0.61 yes
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144 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.6 0.56 0.08 0.08 yes
145 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.52 0.52 0 0.56 yes
146 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.44 0.41 0.04 0.06 yes
147 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.68 0.68 0.04 0.6 yes
148 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.54 0.51 0.15 0.07 yes
149 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.59 0.59 0.19 0.64 yes
150 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.58 0.57 0.01 0.01 yes
151 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.46 0.46 0.18 0.55 yes
152 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.51 0.49 0.21 0.14 yes
153 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.8 0.8 0.13 0.57 yes
154 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.43 0.37 0.14 0.17 yes
155 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.47 0.47 0.11 0.68 yes
156 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.7 0.7 0.26 0.27 yes
157 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.6 0.6 0.03 0.55 yes
158 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.63 0.56 0.01 0.03 yes
159 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.56 0.56 0.07 0.67 yes
160 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.41 0.41 0.11 0.09 yes
161 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.48 0.48 0.11 0.53 yes
162 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.37 0.35 0.2 0.22 yes
163 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.53 no
164 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.08 0.08 0.47 0.57 no
165 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.08 0.08 0.55 0.66 no
166 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.16 0.88 0.39 0.22 no
167 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.09 0.87 0.33 0.18 no
168 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.09 1.11 0.5 0.31 no
169 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.22 0.22 0.49 0.44 no
170 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.18 0.18 0.4 0.42 no
171 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.24 0.24 0.37 0.46 no
172 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.14 0.71 0.49 0.26 no
173 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.09 0.76 0.48 0.26 no
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174 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.21 0.95 0.36 0.2 no
175 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.14 0.14 0.46 0.31 no
176 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.12 0.12 0.46 0.49 no
177 0.2 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.17 0.17 0.58 0.74 no
178 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.09 0.55 0.51 0.26 no
179 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.09 0.72 0.42 0.21 no
180 0.2 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.12 0.58 0.58 0.42 no
181 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.03 0.03 0.51 0.42 no
182 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.09 0.09 0.45 0.43 no
183 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.07 0.07 0.34 0.46 no
184 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.12 1.04 0.44 0.21 no
185 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.27 1.2 0.33 0.04 no
186 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.13 1.17 0.37 0.13 no
187 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.22 0.22 0.5 0.33 no
188 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.06 0.06 0.44 0.42 no
189 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.2 0.2 0.41 0.55 no
190 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.11 1.11 0.42 0.03 no
191 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.12 1.11 0.26 0.09 no
192 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.1 0.89 0.43 0.16 no
193 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.23 0.23 0.54 0.32 no
194 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.11 0.11 0.36 0.38 no
195 0.2 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.28 0.28 0.44 0.69 no
196 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.19 0.97 0.6 0.1 no
197 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.07 0.71 0.33 0 no
198 0.2 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.27 0.53 0.49 0.26 no
199 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.07 0.07 0.47 0.22 no
200 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.11 0.11 0.36 0.35 no
201 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.11 0.11 0.41 0.47 no
202 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.07 1.37 0.58 0.06 no
203 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.04 1.43 0.33 0.15 no
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204 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.02 1.49 0.68 0.01 no
205 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.13 0.13 0.5 0.14 no
206 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.26 0.26 0.42 0.31 no
207 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.17 0.17 0.5 0.58 no
208 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.18 1.19 0.4 0.16 no
209 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.14 0.96 0.37 0.08 no
210 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.18 0.89 0.37 0.11 no
211 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.08 0.08 0.44 0.07 no
212 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.13 0.13 0.37 0.32 no
213 0.2 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.1 0.1 0.37 0.65 no
214 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.24 1 0.36 0.22 no
215 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.1 0.72 0.46 0.06 no
216 0.2 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.04 0.41 0.48 0.22 no
217 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.59 no
218 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.21 0.21 0.37 0.61 no
219 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.21 0.21 0.49 0.6 no
220 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.09 0.54 0.42 0.45 no
221 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.13 0.83 0.25 0.24 no
222 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.2 0.94 0.54 0.37 no
223 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.11 0.11 0.4 0.53 no
224 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.14 0.14 0.42 0.58 no
225 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.26 0.26 0.54 0.66 no
226 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.15 0.55 0.51 0.31 no
227 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.03 0.76 0.47 0.35 no
228 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.16 0.71 0.45 0.33 no
229 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.01 0.01 0.41 0.5 no
230 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.22 0.22 0.35 0.51 no
231 0.35 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.22 0.22 0.42 0.69 no
232 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.19 0.42 0.45 0.31 no
233 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.06 0.64 0.51 0.3 no
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234 0.35 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.1 0.6 0.46 0.33 no
235 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.21 0.21 0.49 0.62 no
236 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.1 0.1 0.32 0.51 no
237 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.27 0.27 0.54 0.74 no
238 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.24 0.8 0.45 0.38 no
239 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.14 0.99 0.29 0.24 no
240 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.08 1.13 0.43 0.12 no
241 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.22 0.22 0.38 0.46 no
242 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.52 no
243 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.21 0.21 0.49 0.7 no
244 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.09 0.75 0.33 0.12 no
245 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.13 0.77 0.34 0.16 no
246 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.16 0.68 0.39 0.06 no
247 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.11 0.11 0.55 0.5 no
248 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.57 no
249 0.35 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.09 0.09 0.46 0.78 no
250 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.09 0.6 0.37 0.11 no
251 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.25 0.62 0.45 0.16 no
252 0.35 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.02 0.5 0.47 0.25 no
253 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.18 0.18 0.47 0.4 no
254 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.08 0.08 0.36 0.46 no
255 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.27 0.27 0.58 0.56 no
256 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.03 0.89 0.43 0.24 no
257 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0 1.08 0.45 0.01 no
258 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.08 1.04 0.54 0.15 no
259 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.08 0.08 0.42 0.36 no
260 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.05 0.05 0.45 0.54 no
261 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.17 0.17 0.42 0.61 no
262 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.12 0.69 0.5 0.05 no
263 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.16 0.81 0.34 0.02 no
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264 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.01 0.86 0.43 0.06 no
265 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.22 0.22 0.32 0.35 no
266 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.47 no
267 0.35 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.1 0.1 0.55 0.87 no
268 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.12 0.62 0.52 0.03 no
269 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.15 0.55 0.41 0.06 no
270 0.35 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.14 0.42 0.49 0.14 no
271 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.07 0.07 0.39 0.7 no
272 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.27 0.27 0.46 0.58 no
273 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.11 0.11 0.47 0.6 no
274 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.13 0.6 0.46 0.53 no
275 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.23 0.64 0.39 0.38 no
276 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.22 0.99 0.53 0.3 no
277 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.03 0.03 0.46 0.68 no
278 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.56 no
279 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.17 0.17 0.44 0.67 no
280 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.1 0.5 0.53 0.45 no
281 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.07 0.44 0.36 0.26 no
282 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.12 0.74 0.54 0.27 no
283 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.05 0.05 0.45 0.59 no
284 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.11 0.11 0.49 0.65 no
285 0.5 0.2 Proportional Stealing 0.23 0.23 0.6 0.84 no
286 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.25 0.4 0.54 0.38 no
287 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.14 0.42 0.29 0.23 no
288 0.5 0.2 Proportional Inflation 0.11 0.46 0.43 0.32 no
289 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.21 0.21 0.33 0.73 no
290 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.11 0.11 0.34 0.77 no
291 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.08 0.08 0.43 0.65 no
292 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.14 0.47 0.46 0.4 no
293 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.15 0.78 0.38 0.22 no
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294 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.04 1.09 0.53 0.08 no
295 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.07 0.07 0.52 0.8 no
296 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.15 0.15 0.39 0.62 no
297 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.15 0.15 0.41 0.66 no
298 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.18 0.4 0.47 0.35 no
299 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.31 no
300 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.24 0.68 0.48 0.02 no
301 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.07 0.07 0.43 0.68 no
302 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.11 0.11 0.4 0.89 no
303 0.5 0.35 Proportional Stealing 0.22 0.22 0.35 0.77 no
304 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.06 0.31 0.55 0.35 no
305 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.05 0.36 0.27 0.07 no
306 0.5 0.35 Proportional Inflation 0.1 0.43 0.43 0.14 no
307 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.04 0.04 0.42 0.62 no
308 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.73 no
309 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0 0 0.52 0.64 no
310 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.15 0.39 0.48 0.38 no
311 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.02 0.76 0.44 0.19 no
312 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.15 1.08 0.58 0.12 no
313 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.09 0.09 0.53 0.76 no
314 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.03 0.03 0.48 0.76 no
315 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.06 0.06 0.37 0.79 no
316 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.2 0.51 0.4 0.17 no
317 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.05 0.56 0.35 0.03 no
318 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.02 0.67 0.4 0.1 no
319 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.18 0.18 0.51 0.7 no
320 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.04 0.04 0.27 0.71 no
321 0.5 0.5 Proportional Stealing 0.06 0.06 0.34 0.83 no
322 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.06 0.18 0.31 0.22 no
323 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.17 0.37 0.4 0.18 no
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324 0.5 0.5 Proportional Inflation 0.1 0.36 0.53 0.11 no
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APPENDIX C
METRICS OF FRAUD IN RUSSIAN ELECTIONS
Region
2007 
Turnout 
Skew
2007 SSD 
Comm 
Party
2007 
SSD 
UR
2008 
Turnout 
Skew
2008 SSD 
Comm 
Party
2008 
SSD UR
2011 
Turnout 
Skew
2011 SSD 
Comm 
Party
2011 
SSD 
UR
2012 
Turnout 
skew
2012 SSD 
Comm Party
2012 
SSD UR
Adygea 0.61 -0.01 0.8 0.23 -0.04 0.77 -0.05 -0.04 0.89 0.8 -0.03 0.31
Agin-Buryat -1.59 0 0.58
Altay 0.15 0 0.55 -0.19 -0.02 0.61 0.08 -0.04 0.79 0.26 -0.02 0.38
Altay Krai 0.42 -0.02 0.13 0.35 -0.02 0.04 0.92 -0.03 0.13 0.75 -0.03 0.14
Amur Oblast -0.15 -0.01 0.4 -0.3 -0.03 0.28 0.59 -0.03 0.38 0.76 -0.02 0.23
Arkhangelsk 1.25 -0.01 -0.06 0.94 -0.02 -0.04 1.68 -0.01 0.1 1.66 0.01 -0.12
Astrakhan 1.08 -0.01 0.33 0.31 -0.03 0.34 0.88 -0.02 0.54 1.22 -0.02 0.28
Bashkortostan -1.74 0.09 2.09 -1.75 0.07 1.35 -1.18 0 1.29 -0.84 0 1.03
Belgorod -0.25 0 1.06 -0.66 0.01 1.06 -0.35 0 1.7 0.25 -0.04 1.02
Bryansk 0.41 -0.02 0.49 -0.05 -0.06 0.5 0.51 -0.04 0.97 0.51 -0.03 0.77
Buryatia 0.32 -0.01 0.43 0.29 -0.04 0.57 0.28 -0.03 0.48
Chechenya -8.34 0 0.3 -1.42 0.03 0.63 -5.98 0 -0.32 -17.23 0.22 5.07
Chelabynsk 0.21 -0.01 0.21 0.34 -0.03 0.29 0.78 -0.02 0.8 0.59 -0.02 0.25
Chita 0.11 -0.01 0.19
Chukchi -0.57 0 0.42 -1 0.02 1.18 -0.77 0 0.86 -0.46 0.05 1.61
Chuvashia 0.04 -0.01 1.07 -0.5 -0.02 0.84 0.55 -0.03 0.85 -0.19 -0.04 0.68
Dagestan -3.01 -0.01 0.3 -3.1 0.01 0.47 -2.77 0 0.16 -2.62 0.03 0.66
Ingushetia -2.63 0 -0.11 0.05 0 0.85 0.27 0 -0.22 0.79 0 0.01
Irkutsk 0.64 -0.01 0.35 0.02 -0.04 0.34 0.86 -0.05 0.38 1.11 -0.04 0.32
Ivanovo 0.81 -0.01 0.18 0.58 -0.02 0.08 0.99 -0.04 0.4 0.96 -0.03 0.4
Jewish 
Autonomous 
0.23 -0.02 0.54 -0.09 -0.03 0.55 0.58 -0.03 0.34 0.58 -0.03 0.3
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Oblast
Kabardino-
Balkaria -2.68 0.07 1.83 -0.13 0.05 0.75 -5.34 1.05 -0.66 0.99 -0.02 0.49
Kaliningrad 1.44 0 -0.26 1.15 -0.04 -0.06 1.52 -0.03 -0.02 1.78 0.02 -0.25
Kalmikia 0.53 -0.01 0.86 0.07 -0.03 0.78 0.21 -0.02 1.16 0.63 -0.02 0.96
Kaluga 0.47 -0.01 0.56 -0.09 -0.04 0.42 0.31 -0.04 0.7 0.67 -0.03 0.58
Kamchatka -0.01 0 -0.02 -0.29 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
Karachaevo-
Cherkessia -3.08 0.02 0.93 -2.26 0.07 1.21 -4.89 -0.01 0.64 -3.68 0.01 0.78
Karelia 1.25 -0.01 -0.16 1.16 -0.02 -0.09 1.74 0 -0.06 1.61 0 -0.21
Kemerov -0.37 0 0.71 -0.88 -0.01 0.38 -0.19 -0.01 0.89 -0.54 0 0.88
Khabarovsk 0.93 -0.01 0.19 0.36 -0.03 0.17 1.12 -0.03 0.2 1.12 -0.02 0.08
Khakassia 0.75 0 0.21 0.41 -0.01 0.14 0.58 -0.03 0.4 0.72 -0.03 0.47
Khanty-Mansii 0.67 0 0.18 0.03 -0.02 0.22 0.85 -0.02 0.33 0.9 -0.02 0.46
Kirov 0.15 -0.01 0.34 -0.36 -0.02 0.42 0.76 -0.03 0.23 0.97 -0.02 0.19
Komi 0.35 -0.01 0.21 -0.21 -0.02 0.33 -0.4 -0.02 0.67 0.25 -0.02 0.45
Kostroma 0.38 -0.01 0.22 0.14 -0.03 0.13 0.69 -0.06 0.36 1.19 -0.05 0.35
Krasnodarsk Krai 0.42 -0.02 0.23 -0.93 -0.01 0.66 0.12 -0.03 0.72 0.37 -0.03 0.6
Krasnoyarsk Krai 0.49 0 0.19 0.36 -0.01 0.07 0.85 -0.04 0.36 0.78 -0.02 0.28
Kurgan 0.15 -0.01 0.28 -0.41 -0.01 0.1 0.26 -0.02 0.31 0.31 -0.02 0.3
Kursk 0.29 -0.01 0.57 -0.19 -0.04 0.41 0.48 -0.03 0.57 0.77 -0.03 0.4
Leningrad 1.59 -0.01 0.27 0.76 -0.03 0.21 1.84 -0.03 0.4 1.01 -0.02 0.37
Lipetsk 0.01 -0.01 0.63 -0.18 0 1.1 0.61 -0.04 0.93 0.61 -0.04 0.74
Magadan 0.43 -0.01 0.21 0.55 -0.02 0.22 0.74 -0.02 1.1 1.08 -0.03 0.23
Mari El -0.45 0 1.32 -0.84 0.14 1.99 0.05 -0.01 2.07 0.29 -0.04 0.94
Mordovia -3.35 0.14 1.96 -2.6 0.32 2.45 -3.17 0.15 2.28 -1.76 0.11 1.78
Moscow 1.05 -0.02 0.38 0.16 -0.03 0.42 1.71 -0.05 0.28 1.24 -0.04 0.34
Moscow City 2.1 -0.01 0.29 0.4 -0.03 0.41 0.93 -0.04 0.57 2.85 -0.03 0.34
Murmansk 0.65 0 -0.15 0.35 -0.02 -0.15 0.7 -0.02 0.06 0.46 -0.01 0.06
Nenets 1.02 0 0.38 1.09 -0.01 0.16 1.1 0 0.02 0.4 -0.02 0.08
Nizhegorod 0.53 -0.01 0.41 0.17 -0.05 0.32 0.27 -0.07 0.67 0.38 -0.03 0.77
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North Osetia 0.37 -0.01 0.18 -0.14 -0.04 0.32 -2.01 -0.01 0.32 -1.2 -0.02 0.18
Novgorod 0.26 -0.01 0.61 0.23 -0.03 0.33 0.52 -0.03 0.6 0.5 -0.02 0.35
Novosibirsk 0.54 -0.02 0.29 0.01 -0.04 0.1 0.52 -0.06 0.42 0.78 -0.03 0.23
Omsk -0.41 -0.02 0.56 -0.76 -0.04 0.37 0.11 -0.04 0.58 0.54 -0.04 0.38
Orel -0.25 0 0.99 -0.8 0.02 1.02 0.41 -0.06 1.1 0.75 -0.07 0.76
Orenburg 0.38 -0.01 0.32 -0.05 -0.04 0.23 0.75 -0.04 0.37 0.82 -0.04 0.29
Penza -0.31 0 0.9 -0.97 -0.02 0.69 -0.09 -0.02 1.13 0.29 -0.01 1.15
Perm Krai 1.13 -0.01 0.33 0.84 -0.02 0.19 1.65 -0.02 0.19 1.64 -0.01 0.12
Primorsky Krai 0.51 -0.01 0.33 -0.22 -0.02 0.65 1.07 -0.04 0.56 0.59 -0.04 0.57
Pskov 0.38 -0.02 0.57 -0.32 -0.02 0.73 0.66 -0.05 0.59 0.98 -0.03 0.4
Rostov 0.12 0 1.04 -0.2 0 0.8 0.57 -0.03 1.02 0.76 -0.03 0.75
Ryazan 0.66 -0.02 0.47 0.77 -0.05 0.34 0.86 -0.04 0.64 0.82 -0.04 0.46
Sakha Yakutia -0.27 -0.01 0.19 -0.26 0 0.23 -0.04 -0.02 0.47 -0.15 -0.01 0.49
Sakhalin 0.37 -0.01 -0.16 0.45 -0.03 -0.05 0.48 -0.03 0.01 0.5 -0.03 0.06
Samara 0.66 -0.02 0.48 0.17 -0.04 0.33 0.78 -0.05 0.57 0.72 -0.03 0.33
Saratov 0.26 -0.01 0.74 -0.64 -0.01 0.74 -0.14 -0.01 1.02 0.29 -0.02 0.76
Smolensk 0.46 -0.02 0.52 -0.09 -0.05 0.45 0.49 -0.04 0.63 0.76 -0.04 0.43
St Petersburg City 2.56 -0.01 0.12 0.64 -0.03 0.15 1.77 -0.01 0.14 1.69 -0.02 0.37
Stavropolsky Krai 1.32 -0.01 0.22 0.37 -0.05 0.36 1.14 -0.02 0.26 0.84 -0.03 0.24
Sverdlovsk 1.36 0 0.19 1.34 -0.01 0.17 1.84 -0.02 0.15 1.72 -0.01 0.01
Tamboy 0.24 -0.03 0.51 -0.71 -0.02 0.57 -0.31 -0.02 0.55 -0.07 -0.03 0.48
Tatarstan -1.2 0.05 2.1 -1.11 0.16 2.15 -1.3 0.04 1.58 -1.25 0.05 1.48
Tomsk 0.18 -0.01 0.44 0.32 -0.03 0.32 0.98 -0.04 0.46 1.07 -0.03 0.18
Tula 1.12 -0.01 0.37 0.08 -0.04 0.33 -0.42 -0.02 0.53 0.18 -0.03 0.42
Tuva -0.55 0 0.53 -0.79 0.01 0.58 -1.4 0 0.84 -1.57 0.01 1
Tver 0.65 -0.01 0.44 0.17 -0.03 0.45 0.8 -0.04 0.64 1.01 -0.03 0.41
Tyumen -0.73 0.01 1.66 -0.88 0.09 2.34 -0.73 0.03 2.1 0 0.03 1.64
Udmurtia 0.49 -0.01 0.61 0.21 -0.02 0.53 0.73 -0.03 0.68 0.76 -0.02 0.54
Uliyanovsk -0.08 -0.01 0.76 -0.25 -0.04 0.47 0.1 -0.03 1.12 0.46 -0.05 0.64
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Ust-Orda Buryat -0.72 0 0.53
Vladimir 0.56 0 0.04 0.66 -0.03 0.14 1.53 -0.04 0.73 1.8 0 0.02
Volgograd 0.44 -0.01 0.21 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.93 -0.04 0.5 0.67 -0.03 0.5
Vologda 0.41 -0.01 0.3 0.22 -0.02 0.26 1.22 -0.01 0.24 1.34 -0.02 0.24
Voronezh -0.02 -0.01 0.8 -0.21 -0.04 0.71 -0.1 -0.02 1.22 0.39 -0.03 0.99
Yamal-Nenets -0.44 0 0.94 -0.75 0.1 1.75 -0.22 0.01 1.6 -1.53 0.09 1.62
Yaroslav 0.75 -0.01 0.35 0.84 -0.03 0.21 1.26 -0.04 0.26 1.34 -0.03 0.23
Zabaykalsky 0.06 -0.03 0.25 0.5 -0.03 0.31 0.7 -0.02 0.23
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APPENDIX D
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR URBAN/RURAL DIVIDE IN RUSSIA
2012
Number of obs = 78
SSD Putin Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval]
Population 
Density -.0000252 .0000667 -0.38 0.706 -.0001581 .0001076
Constant .5618519 .0764115 7.35 0.000 .4096652 .7140386
2011
Number of obs = 78
SSD United 
Russia Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Population 
Density -.0000209 .0000529 -0.39 0.694 -.0001262 .0000844
Constant .6194174 .0605865 10.22 0.000 .4987488 .7400859
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